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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The end of the Cold War marked the return of Eastern European nations to their natural 
state: a return to the natural and geographical and historical boundaries of Europe1. The 
European Union has been enlarging since it was created in 1952.  It has grown from six, nine, 
and twelve to fifteen current Member States to finally absorb a big-bang enlargement of ten 
members.  On May 1, 2004, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the Club.  The European Union is today at the 
crossroads of its development.  Either, it successfully integrates the new members, 
overcoming the challenges of the process by deeply reforming its current structure; or, it fails 
and it is a true stalemate for its future.  The rejection of the Constitution by France and 
Netherlands hinders this process of deeper integration that would allow the European Union 
to adapt and function more effectively.  What is ultimately at stake is the future of Europe and 
its capacity to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.  Indeed, the European Union 
has a historical opportunity to reverse the division of the European continent and to contribute 
towards a stable and political and economic order throughout Europe resting on fundamental 
values and principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and 
minorities.  It is also a unique opportunity for Europe to speak with a single voice on the 
international stage and become a true political player rather than just an economic giant ‘with 
 
1 K. M. Fierke and Antje Wiener. “Constructing Institutional interests EU and NATO enlargement”,  
Journal of European Public Policy 6:5, pp: 721-42, (1999), 730 
2soft teeth’. The question is how EU enlargement affects the current EU security 
structure. Specifically, what the European Union accession implies for the security of new 
members, how their accession affects the current structure of EU security and whether their 
security needs and interests of the new members have been taken into account by the current 
European Union institutions.  However, despite a negligible involvement on the ground and 
an expected minimal security interest, the accession of New Member States has an impact on 
the security of European Union.  The enlargement certainly poses problems for the identity of 
European security: it raises the question of where Europe’s Eastern and Southern frontiers 
actually lie. The new members shift Europe’s center of gravity to the East or in the blunt 
words of Secretary Rumsfeld during the 2003 transatlantic rift on Iraq, there is an ’Old 
Europe’ and a ‘New Europe’2. The Iraqi crisis obviously highlighted not only the absence of 
a coherent foreign policy but also differences in perceptions on what European Security 
means.  The EU Security Doctrine issued short after the crisis, tended to remedy those 
cleavages by ‘imposing’ standard views on European Union Members.  But practically, it is 
hard to believe that in less than two years, the gap has been bridged and that there is a true 
common sense of security.  
A preliminary chapter will present the hypotheses and the approach to test them.  
Before the presentation of the findings, it is however necessary to define enlargement: the 
history of the process, the impact on current Member States, European Institutions and New 
 
2 Scott Brunstetter, “A changing view of responsibility? German security in the Post-9/11 World” in Old 
Europe, New Europe and the US , Tom Lansford, Blagovest Tashev Ed., (Ashgate 2005), 30 
3Member States and how the literature covers it.  The following chapters attempt to 
establish a definition of European security through a discussion of the literature on security, a 
presentation of the institutions and their mechanisms, including the debate on the relationship 
between the European Security Defense Policy and NATO.  The ‘findings’ chapter shows how 
the responding population confirms that the new entrants definitely have an impact on 
European security and shows that true, the logistical commitment is negligible compared to 
current members and even Third states.  The last chapter discusses the further implications of 
enlargement for European security, and ways to improve European security and foreign policy 
efficiency in general, by better integrating the needs of an enlarged Europe.   
4CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
Despite a negligible involvement on the ground and an expected minimal security 
interest, the accession of New Member States has an impact on the security of European 
Union, states the theory. The hypotheses are the following: 
H0: The involvement of New Member States in CFSP/ESDP is negligible and does not 
affect the outcome of ESDP operations.  
H1: The involvement of new member states in ESDP operations is significant because it 
their national security. 
H2: The involvement of new member states in ESDP operations is significant because it 
translates the willingness to be part of European Security.  
A case study approach is chosen to test the hypotheses.  Typically, a case study is 
where the researcher explores in depth a program, an event, an activity, a process, or one 
or more individuals.  The cases are bounded by time and activity, and researchers collect 
detailed information using a variety of data collection procedures over a sustained period 
of time3. Here, the involvement of New Member States in current ESDP operations is 
reviewed.  The timeframe is the operations launched between 2003 and now (pre-
accession and post-accession).  The sample population is the CEECS (Central Eastern 
European Countries) and the Baltic States, both former Communist countries and part of 
 
3 John W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Approaches, ed. (Sage, 2003), 
15 
5the big bang enlargement.  A questionnaire submitted to security officials combined with hard 
data from fact sheets from the European Council and scholarly articles confirms that: despite a 
minimal commitment in numbers, New Member States’ involvement is significant and 
translates their security interests. 
The questionnaire consists of addressing the involvement in any ESDP operation of 
the respondent’s country choice: in particularly, the nature of the involvement (compliance 
with treaties, peacekeeping), the logistical and financial contribution (how many troops, 
budget, timeframe), the national security interest of the participant’s country, the shaping of the 
decision-making process leading to the participation (collective, consulting with other member 
states…), the quality of the CFSP as a framework versus other entities and finally a review-
comparison of the participation versus other operations (See Appendix).  Regarding the 
responding population, the target is Central Eastern European Countries and Baltic States 
involved in at least two ESDP operations.  The minimum of two ensures that there is not outlier 
in the data, and that the country is sufficiently involved with CFSP.  Based on preliminary 
research, five countries match the requirements: Hungary, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia and Czech 
Republic.  The second phase in the data collection is the choice of individual respondents and 
the institutions they represent: the respondents need to be officials as well as an expert opinion. 
The best places to tap were embassies to the United States, the European Union section of the 
ministry for foreign affairs of each country and the permanent representation of the country to 
the European Union.  Within those institutions, officials in charge of ESDP issues or Political 
Security Committee issues are targeted. Participants are allowed to add comments on each 
questionnaire, which conveys the language and words of participants. There is then a validation 
stage where the responses from the questionnaire are compared with hard data. Official 
6documents from the CFSP, such as fact sheets, European Council minutes and website 
operations if available, as well as scholarly articles qualify as hard data and then help to 
validate the data.  
 
7CHAPTER III 
HISTORY, SCOPE AND DEFIINITION OF ENLARGEMENT 
Historical process 
 The disappearance of the Iron Curtain in 1989/90 presented the countries of both Eastern 
and Western Europe with the challenge of completely redefining their relationship.  Both sides 
seized the opportunity of finally overcoming the division of Europe.  The EU decided to invite 
these countries to become part of the European Union and these countries were prepared to 
make the enormous reform efforts required to achieve this goal4. The philosophy of 
enlargement is to introduce stable institutions, changes of government on the basis of free and 
democratic elections, reinforced protection of human rights, including rights of minorities, and 
market economy principles.  The EU aims at that "no new dividing lines will be drawn across 
our continent"5. Each New Member State brings to the EU its own political, economic, 
cultural, historical and geographical heritage, thus enriching Europe as a Union and has the 
ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of Political, 
Economic and Monetary Union6. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe made use of this 
opportunity as follows: Hungary in March 1994, Poland in April 1994, Romania and Slovakia 
 
4 German Ministry for Foreign Affairs , “The enlargement of the European Union” , www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/www/en/index_html (2005) 
5 Gunther Verheugen, “An unprecedented enlargement”, Conclusion on regular reports 2001, Strategy 
Paper 2001, DG Enlargement, European Commission, http://Europa.eu.int/comm./enlargement/index.html,
(2001) 
6 European Commission, More unity and more diversity: the EU’s biggest enlargement, (Directorate 
General for Press and Communication, 2003) 
8in June 1995, Latvia in October 1995, Estonia in November 1995, Lithuania and Bulgaria in 
December 1995, the Czech Republic in January 1996 and Slovenia in June 1996. Turkey had 
already announced its desire to become a member in April 1987. Cyprus and Malta had done 
likewise in July 19907.
In order to join the Union, candidate countries had to comply with a set of criteria 
called ‘the Copenhagen Criteria’8. The ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ require stability of 
institutions, democracy, and the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection 
of minorities.  Newcomers were supposed to establish a functioning market economy and 
adhere to the aims of Political, Economic and Monetary Union.  These principles were 
following the Article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union: "The Union is founded on 
the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
and the rule of law."9 These principles were emphasized in the Charter of Fundamental 
rights of the European Union10, which was proclaimed at the Nice European Council in 
December 200011. Now the technical process of membership had been defined by the 
Berlin European Council12, which had set out a clear framework for the financial aspects 
of enlargement.  The European Council of Nice had defined the framework for the 
institutional reform necessary for Enlargement13. Negotiations were conducted on the 
 
7 German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, loc. cit. 
8 Verheugen, loc. cit. 
9 European Commission, “Human Rights Charter”, http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html (2005) 
10`European`Commission, “Charter of Human Rights”, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/unit/charte/en/rights.html (2005) 
11 European Commission, “Nice Treaty Conclusions”,  http://europa.eu.int/comm/nice_treaty/index_en.htm
(2005) 
12 European Union Council, “Berlin European Council Conclusions, 24-25 March 1999”, 
http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/mar99_en.htm (2005) 
13European Commission, “Nice European Council Summit conclusions”,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/nice_council/index (2000) 
9basis of the existing acquis, divided in chapters14. These were the necessary and 
sufficient conditions defined at the outset for accomplishing the first accessions.  The 
process did not happen overnight and since the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was a 
succession of measures to progressively prepare the entrants.  In 1989, the EU removed 
long-standing import quotas on a number of products, extended the Generalized System 
of Preferences (GSP) and, over the next few years, concluded Trade and Cooperation 
Agreements with Bulgaria, the former Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovenia.  In the meantime, the European Community’s 
PHARE Program (Poland Hungary Aid for the Reconstruction of the Economy) 15,
created in 1989, set out to provide financial support for the countries’ efforts to reform 
and rebuild their economies.  PHARE soon became the world’s largest assistance 
program in Central Europe, providing technical expertise and investment support.  In 
August 1990, the Commission proposed moving status with the so-called ‘Europe 
Agreements’.  By early 2000, ten Europe Agreements were signed with Hungary, Poland, 
the Czech and Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Lithuania, Estonia and 
Latvia.  The Europe Agreements aimed at gradually establishing free-trade by 
progressive abolition of tariffs16. The European Community had already established 
similar Association Agreements with Turkey (1963), Malta (1970) and Cyprus (1972).  
From 2000, the Community doubled its pre-accession assistance to over €3 billion a year.  
The PHARE Program was now accompanied by two new instruments, which prepared 
 
14 DG Enlargement,  “Negotiation Chapters”,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/chapters/
(2005) 
15 Verheugen  (2001):  41 
16 Falkner Gerda, “Enlarging the European Union: the short-term success of incrementalism and De-
politicisation”, Working Paper Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, (July 2000) 
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for the Structural Funds. ISPA17 (Pre-Accession Structural Instrument) allocates over €1 
billion a year to investment in environment and transport infrastructure, and SAPARD 
(Special Accession Program for Agriculture and Rural Development) allocates over €500 
million a year to agricultural and rural development. 
 But the biggest challenge for the candidates was not only to transform their institutions 
but to implement the ‘acquis communautaire’ a set of 3,000 EU laws, sets and standards.   The 
‘acquis communautaire’ commits the member states (or the future ones) to accept all previous 
and future centralizing measures.  It includes not only the decisions of the Council of Ministers 
and the European Commission but also all the rulings of the European Court of Justice.  The 
acquis covers 80,000 pages and often during the process, candidates would complain that the 
acquis is unsuitable to their system.  In 2000, the Feira European Council18 recalled that 
"progress in the negotiations depended on the incorporation by the candidate countries of the 
acquis in their national legislation and especially on their capacity to effectively implement 
and enforce it", by strengthening their administrative and judicial structures.  In June 2001, the 
Göteborg European Council19 stressed again the importance that candidate countries make 
continued progress in transposing, implementing and enforcing the ‘acquis’, and that they pay 
particular attention to “putting in place adequate administrative structures and to reforming 
their judicial systems and their civil service”20. In the study at hand, it is interesting to look at 
the transposition of the foreign policy ‘acquis’.  Co-operation in justice and home affairs was a 
main concern, both in view of the fight against terrorism and organized crime and the longer-
term discussions on the possible creation of common border control arrangements.  The 
 
17 Verheugen  (2001):  16 
18 Verheugen  (2001):  31 
19 European Council Swedish Presidency, http://eu2001.se/eu2001.index, (2001) 
20 http://eu2001.se/eu2001.index (2001) 
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‘Schengen Agreement’21 applies to all new Member States. Full participation in it is based on a 
two-step process. The New Member States first need to achieve a high level of external border 
control upon accession whereas the lifting of internal border controls with current Member 
States will take place only at a later stage, subject to a separate decision by the Council.  
Despite a painstaking and lengthy process, the accession negotiations between the EU 
and ten accession candidates – Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia – were concluded at the European Council of 
12-13 December 2002, also held in Copenhagen.  The ceremonial signing of the Treaty of 
Accession with the ten accession countries took place in Athens on 16 April 2003 with the 
participation of the Heads of State and Government and the Foreign Ministers of the countries 
involved.  The Treaty of Accession sets out the conditions of accession for the ten accession 
countries on 1 May 2004. Under Article 49 of the EU Treaty, the formal pre-conditions for the 
signing were the positive opinion of the European Commission (given on 19 February 2003), 
the approval of the European Parliament of each application for accession (granted with 
overwhelming majority for each country on 9 April 2003) and finally the decision taken by the 
European Council on 14 April 2003 to accept new member states22.
Definition of enlargement policy 
Type of the enlargement policy
Within the EU, policy-making authority constantly swings between supranational 
institutions and Member States. Some policies are entirely in the hands of supranational 
 
21 German Foreign Affairs Ministry, “The Schengen Agreement and the Convention Implementing the 
Schengen Agreement”, 
http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/www/en/willkommen/einreisebestimmungen/schengen_html (2005) 
22 German Foreign Affairs Ministry, “The enlargement of the European Union”, www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/www/en/index_html, (2004) 
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institutions such as competition where member States have a little say.  These types of 
policies can also be identified as ‘negative integration’ policies 23 referring to the EU 
unique effectiveness in dismantling post-war controls of national governments over their 
own economic boundaries.  In the fields of EU policy dealing with other countries, the 
patterns also vary. Trade has been strongly influenced by relatively extensive internal 
regime. But when it comes to foreign policy, the Member States have delegated very little 
to the EU institutions because security is a jealously preserved domestic domain.24 The 
1992 Maastricht Treaty’s creation of three pillars identified those policy areas related to 
the Union’s traditional core activities (pillar 1), the foreign and security policy (pillar 2) 
and the justice and home affairs (pillar 3).  These areas are usually under the primary 
jurisdiction of the Council or Ministers and the supranational institutions were not 
allowed to exercise their usual powers in these fields. However since the 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty, asylum, immigration, judicial cooperation in civil matters were 
transferred to Pillar 1 and the Commission was given its traditional powers of initiatives 
in 200225. Scharpf characterizes those ‘polity building’ policies as ‘positive integration’ 
ones because they reconstruct a capacity for market-correcting regulations at the 
European level.  They continue to depend on unanimity in the Council of Ministers and 
are easily blocked by conflicts of interests among these governments. The problem with 
enlargement is it takes a little bit of everything and it is difficult to categorize it as a 
specific policy.  
 
23 Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe: effective and democratic? (Oxford University Press, 1999), 2. 
24 Helen Wallace (2000) “The policy process: a moving pendulum”, in  Policy-making in the European 
Union, Edited by Helen Wallace and William Wallace, (Oxford University Press, 2000), 45 
25 Alberta Sbragia, “Key policies”, in The Institutions of the European Union, Edited by John Peterson and 
Michael Shackelton, (Oxford university Press 2002), 130 
13
The challenge and the need to devise a policy towards Eastern European 
Countries were very sudden due to of course the unexpected collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Wallace reminds us of the dangers of assuming the relative stability of integration 
patterns at any given moment and of neglecting the outside world26. This succession of 
events generated new policy for the EU agenda (rather than being dealt with bilaterally 
by the member states) in part because it was quickly agreed among EU governments and 
the Commission that the EU would be the best forum for response and also because 
politicians from the CEECs directed their expectations to the EU.  Sketching and 
managing the new relationship required a significant degree of innovation, creativity, and 
strategic policy-making27. The EU had to rethink its all functioning in order to absorb 
enlargement. Enlargement did not have a single location in the policy process and by 
nature could not be strictly supranational _where member states have surrendered their 
sovereignty to supranational institutions_ nor intergovernmental where Member States 
make the major decisions.  Enlargement is a broad policy framework which draws from a 
range of distinctive policy areas.  Sedelmeier identifies it as a ‘composite’ policy28: he
explains that it requires an analytical distinction between two dimensions of the policy: 
(1) decisions about the macro-level of policy, to determine the overall objectives and 
parameters of policy _for instance, an agreement on the direction in which the 
relationship should evolve (between standard external relations, special relationship or 
membership)_ (2) decisions about the specific detail and substance of policy, generally 
dealt with by the various policy makers that have the relevant technical expertise and 
 
26 Ulrich Sedelmeier, Helen Wallace.  “Eastern Enlargement: Strategy or Second Thoughts?”, in Policy-
Making in the European Union, Fourth Edition, (Oxford 2000), 429 
27 Sedelmeier, Wallace, op. cit., 428 
28 Sedelmeier, Wallace ibid.  
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decision-making competences _ for instance, the specific mechanisms through which the 
EU might consult the CEECs on foreign policy issues_.  But policy towards Eastern 
Europe does not exist independently of those decisions, which make up these separate 
sub-policies. In other words, the macro-policy is composed of a range of distinctive 
meso-policies, “and it is these which define the substance of policy, and feed back into 
the overall policy”.  The meso policies that constitute EU policy towards the CEECs are 
simultaneously parts of other policy areas. Instruments that this policy uses to achieve its 
objectives are at the same time instruments that are employed in other policy areas and 
for quite different purposes.  This represents a challenge in terms of coordination. It 
implies that policy-making is less characterized by inter-state bargaining than by 
‘bargaining between distinctive groups of policy-makers and by transgovernmental 
alliances and that it generates obstacles to strategic policy-making’29.
Explaining Enlargement with integration theory
Another approach to explain integration and enlargement independently from the 
institutions is the speed and the scope of it, and according to some scholars, there is one factor 
which has always conditioned the EU unification process: ‘multilayred internal cleavages’.  
These divisions concern the scope of integration which is desirable to pursue, the role the 
United States should play within Europe, and the style of diplomacy which the EU should 
adopt, conditioned by member States’ stances: ‘big’ versus ‘small’, ‘Atlanticist’ versus 
‘Europeanist’30. These elements suggest that the concept of ‘variable geometry’ was intrinsic 
to the European unification process from the start and resulted in building coalitions among 
different member states according to the issue.  Wallace refers to a ‘multi-tier community’, 
 
29 Sedelmeier, Wallace, op. cit., 430 
30 Victoria Curzon Price and others. The Enlargement of the European Union, (Routledge 1999), 18 
15
similar to Delors ‘concentric circles’, in which a core of Member States accomplishes the 
objectives set by the EU while the others tag along.  Each core member has its own foreign 
policy concerns which leads in turns to other circles of states linked to the EU with various 
degrees of intensity31. ‘Variable speed’ or variable ‘geometry’ refers to the process of having 
some Member States moving more rapidly than others.  One could even go as far as suggesting 
‘á la carte’ integration, according to which members can choose their own integration 
policies.  Denmark, Sweden and the UK opted out for instance from the Euro.  ‘Flexibility’ is a 
competing term used by the Commission.  It captures a situation in which a sub-group of 
Member States moves towards deeper integration than the others, on the premise that all 
member states will one day do reach the same destination.  The CEECs for example are not 
obliged to sign up for all EU obligations at once.  Germany, France and more reluctantly 
Britain back flexibility.  The inner core provides the leadership and direction of the EU, ensures 
the continued commitment of larger countries, and avoids the possibility that the slowest ship 
could determine the pace of the convoy.  The inner core pools their sovereignty, pushes 
towards a common currency, a common defense and foreign policies and a common set of 
laws.  It traditionally includes Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. 
The second circle would include Britain and some other member countries, which would 
remain at their present level of integration. A final outer circle would contain other member and 
aspirant states. 
 The most ambitious enlargement ever: comparison with early 
enlargements 
 
31 Curzon Price and others. Op. cit., 18 
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Past experiences show that widening has not been a politically easy task. 
Enlargement as ‘joining and truly adhering to the integrated conditions of the member states 
has been a painfully slow and internally combative process’32. A relevant round to compare is 
the Mediterranean enlargement, in terms of development and regime legacies. In both cases 
democratic reforms preceded the discussion about accession to the EU.  In both cases, GNP per 
capita was much lower that of the EU.  In both cases, opposition to the new members by some 
of the old members was not negligible, especially with regard to the agricultural sector33.
However, CEECs are still poorer than the Mediterranean countries and transition from central 
planning to market economy is still on the way.  Therefore, redistribution demands are still 
very high, especially with regard to the Common Agricultural Policy.  As we said previously, 
in some sensitive sectors such as agriculture, steel, textiles and some chemicals, CEECs have 
comparative advantages that threaten EU industries.  Threatening East West migration 
complicates the picture considerably says Vosgerau.  There are public fears of importing crime, 
large-scale migration and social dumping.  Similar worries were expressed at the 
Mediterranean enlargements in 1981 and 1986.  Those fears turned out to be unjustified.  The 
partnership approach was however different. Since the first Mediterranean widening, the new 
entrants have regular had prior bilateral trade agreements with the Union. It was not the case 
with the Mediterranean members.  The Greek Association Agreement with the EC was signed 
in 1961, suspended during the military regime and then reinstated at the end of the tyranny.  
Spain and Portugal had concluded bilateral trade agreements with the EC before their 
 
32 Gerda Falkner, “Enlarging the European Union: the short-term success of incrementalism and De-
politicisation”, Working Paper Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, (July 2000) 
33 Hans-Jürgen Vosgerau and others. “Joining the club: options for integrating Central and Eastern 
Countries into the European Union” in Black  Stanley (ed), Europe’s economy looks East, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 9 
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accession, starting negotiations in 1978 and 1979 respectively34. Confronted with the changing 
geopolitical situation, the Union slightly modified its approach with CEECs. As we mentioned 
earlier, the process of pre-accession and financial assistance was lengthier and wider.  
More generally, this enlargement is also truly different from a geopolitical perspective. 
First, the Union is not enlarging with a ‘residual element’ of a fragmented or split Europe.  All 
earlier enlargements, even including to some extent the latest one, were based on the 
assumption or the reality that Europe was divided into two parts35. This enlargement ends the 
artificial division of Europe.   It is a true reunification of a model based on a set of shared 
values and practices going back to the Enlightment and the democratic revolutions of the 
eighteenth century.  In the words of Foreign Minister Melescanu from Romania: ‘Today’s 
Europe is to be found where its democratic, liberal and humanist values and practices succeed 
in shutting the door on the nightmare of authoritarian regimes, command economies and a 
disrespect for human rights and fundamental freedoms36. Second, the EU had to consider 
enlargement in a global framework.  How will the Eastern enlargement helm the EU in the 
current distribution of capabilities? Central and Eastern Europe provides a large number of new 
production locations and cheap labor.  The region has a high level of flexibility, following the 
destruction of the old system.  Flexibility, institutional organization, innovative capacity and 
social tolerance are among the most important factors of competitiveness of the twenty-first 
century. 
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This Enlargement is also a challenge of integration.  It raises the problem of how much 
diversity the EU’s foundation can tolerate37. The only way to ‘manage this diversity’ is to take 
into consideration several factors: first to reinforce and reaffirm the concept of solidarity, 
second, to focus on governance as of a crucial importance in this post-accession phase, third, to 
rethink the institutions and structure of the Union and fourth to foster an integrated 
neighborhood policy.  However, the new entrants are often seen different by reason of history, 
level of development and lack of democratic traditions.  On the other side, the worries for the 
Eastern countries are the fear of westernization, in a bad way.  Eastern European citizens fear 
that customs and traditions might be eroded by permissive “Western” values and norms, that 
their weaker economies might be undermined by competition and that there social welfare will 
deteriorate or become too expensive.  As the reflection group points out, candidate countries 
want to be reassured they will be treated ‘as full and equal partners, not second-class 
members.’38 
This Enlargement is finally more a two-way relationship in comparison with earlier 
rounds.  It is not only the EU that imposes a set of rules. There is true interaction between EU 
institutions and new members.  Brigid Fowler notices within the candidate countries close to 
join, a set of highly complex and dynamic interrelationships, in which the EU influence is 
mediated through a range of other factors, both domestic and international, and embedded in 
much wider processes of change39. National cultures and traditions, bureaucratic and party 
politics are shaping the impact of the EU in the CEECs, sometimes reinforcing existing features 
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as much as changing them.  This helps to explain diversity of outcomes among the candidate 
states, despite the toughness and extent of EU conditionality. 
Weaknesses in the enlargement literature and significance of the study. 
However, the literature on enlargement suffers from several weaknesses40. It often 
analyzes policy-oriented studies of single cases, such as single enlargement rounds of single 
organizations, single member or accession countries, or even single policy areas. 
Schimmelfennig identifies four main reasons: first, the isolation of the study of EU enlargement 
which separates it from the study of other international organizations, second the lack of 
comparative research designs, third an under-specification of independent variables and a 
neglect of exploring alternative explanations.  Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier suggest four 
main dimensions of enlargement that generate separate dependent variables for the study of 
enlargement.  First, the applicant enlargement politics: the question here is why and under 
which conditions do non-members seek accession to a regional organization? The second 
aspect relates to the politics of Member States.  It addresses the reasons why a Member State of 
a regional organization favors or opposes enlargement to a particular country.  These studies 
usually focus on one member only.  Schimmelfering and Sedelmeier argue that cross-country 
would benefit the literature.  The third aspect is EU enlargement politics.  The question here is: 
“under which conditions does the regional organization admit a new member, or modify its 
institutional relationship with outside states?”  There are two dimensions here: first a macro 
dimension 41 addressing the reason why the organization prefers to admit one state rather than 
another, and why it offers membership versus a partnership.  Again, an emerging body in this 
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literature has only focused on single cases.  There have been some cross-sectional comparisons 
of international organizations, over a round of enlargement, mainly between the EU and 
NATO42. These comparisons usually raise the issue of why some states are member of  one 
but not another and why do some organizations have a larger membership and integrate more 
quickly than others.  The substantive or policy dimension of EU politics seeks to explain the 
specific outcomes of accession negotiations in distinctive policy area, but also the nature of 
pre-accession conditionality. The key question is to what extent outcomes reflect the 
preferences of certain actors, such as the applicants, member states, societal interest groups or 
institutional actors.  Again, the literature has neglected it and there have been very few 
informed comparisons between policy areas or across enlargement rounds.  Finally, 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier look at the impact of enlargement that affects both the 
organization and the state to which its institutional rules are extended.  The main questions here 
are: how does enlargement change the identity, the interests and the behavior of governmental 
and societal actors?  How does enlargement affect the distribution of power and interests in the 
organization, and the effects on deepening integration?  This dimension has been neglected in 
theoretical studies of enlargement.  The Europeanization has analyzed the effects of 
membership on new members but there are mainly single case studies as well as comparisons 
between ‘new’ and ‘old’ Member States.  Regarding the Eastern enlargement, there is little 
cross-analysis between theoretical studies of the impact of international organization; the 
Europeanization literature; the theoretical literature on the transformations in the CEECs and 
the mainly descriptive literature on the effect of the EU candidates which is often limited to 
single countries and single policy areas. 
To summarize, the literature has focused on EFTA applicants’ politics and the EU macro 
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politics on Eastern enlargement.  The greatest deficits are in the study of the policy dimension 
and the impact of enlargement and the comparative analysis of member states politics 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CURRENT STATE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY  
 European responses to the Iraqi Crisis 
The diplomatic rift within Europe on the hawkish US stance, which led to the invasion 
of Iraq, illustrates the differences in perceptions of European security.  The crisis was a true 
pre-accession test for an enlarging EU to be.  It was expected that having ten new members 
would considerably alter the structure of European security, and there was some dissension on 
what stance to follow on Iraq. In the Iraqi crisis, the 15 member (to become 25) EU has not 
spoken with a single voice but more in a cacophony. 
 The split
On January 27, 2003 after lengthy negotiation, Mr. Solana, CFSP (Common Foreign Security 
Policy) High Representative finally succeeded in reaching agreement for a common policy on 
Iraq for all 15-member states.  It had been a painful exercise but Member States could at least 
agree that the United Nations inspectors were in Iraq and should be allowed to carry out their 
work.43 A few days before, at the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the ‘Elysee 
Treaty’, France and Germany declared their common anti-war position.  It shifted the national 
Atlanticist German position in the anti-war camp.  President Chirac and Chancellor ShrÖder 
came out with a joint statement urging restraint and respect for the United Nations without
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warning their colleagues.  President Chirac declared: “For forty years, each decisive step was 
taken in Europe thanks to the motor that Germany and France represent…Experience shows 
that when Berlin and Paris agree, Europe can move forward; if there is disagreement, Europe 
marks time.” On January 30th, the ‘Letter of Eight’ was published.  The letter signed by eight 
European heads of state (Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland) expressed support for the US military intervention. They did so without even 
attempting to consult the other countries in the enlarged European Union.  It caused 
consternation around Europe. From now on, a clear division between those who supported war 
and those who opposed it was laid.  A couple of days later, a new letter of support for US 
intervention was published.  This letter, known as the ‘Vilnius 10’ had been signed by ten 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Macedonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), all future members or candidates of the 
European Union. It showed that there was indeed a different view between an “old Europe” led 
by France and Germany, and the “new” entrants emerging from the Warsaw Pact. 
It showed that none of the procedures of the EU had been followed: neither Greece, 
holding the rotating EU presidency, nor Javier Solana, the “High Representative” for Foreign 
Policy, had been informed.  The 1991 Maastricht Treaty also binding EU member states to 
“refrain from any action which is contrary to the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a 
cohesive force in international relations”44 was not respected.  The common foreign policy was 
now in shambles. 
 Immediate explanations of the European behavior.
44 Daniel Dombey Daniel, George Parker. “Giscard lambastes European leaders divisions over Saddam”, 
Financial Times, (February 8, 2003)  
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Charles Kupchan45 explains that preserving the Atlantic link has been one of the key 
motivations inducing Spain, Britain and the Eastern countries to side with the US.  Britain and 
France have two conceptions of the world. Britain traditionally sees a unipolar world where 
Europeans should generally support the US on security issues. Prime Minister Blair declared46:
“We need one polar power which encompasses a strategic partnership between Europe and 
America”.  Blair thinks that a multipolar world would develop into rival centers of power. 
France holds a multilateral vision of the world, where Europe is a major pole and should not 
hesitate to oppose the US when they are wrong47. At the time, Chancellor SchrÖder believed 
that Germany is an important country and should be respected as such -by the European 
Commission, by other EU partners but also by the US48. As Kupchan summarized it: “Europe 
is too strong to be Washington lackey but too weak to be either an effective partner or a 
formidable counterpart”.  Spain and Britain shared a resentment of the traditional behavior of 
France and Germany in setting the EU agenda 3. The ‘Letter of Eight’ was therefore an 
opportunity to put France and Germany in their place.  It was a chance for Mr. Blair to show 
that there was an alternative leadership pole in Europe.  For Mr. Aznar, it was also a means of 
getting back at Mr. Chirac, who had in effect sided with Rabat over the Moroccan occupation 
of the island of Perejil.  And for all signatories, it was a signal that the enlarged Europe could 
produce alliances with enough votes in the European Council to outweigh the Paris-Berlin axis. 
The new members certainly supported the US but it did not necessarily mean that they 
would ally to Washington on every issue49. The test of loyalty over Iraq came at an awkward 
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moment.  The US Senate was at the time considering ratification of the second enlargement of 
NATO.  The ‘Letter of Ten’ issued by the candidates for NATO membership was orchestrated 
by the American Bruce Jackson who had lobbied effectively to have those members join 
NATO. In the near future it was expected that new members would more likely tip the balance 
towards support for NATO and away from France and other countries wanting to create a 
European counterweight to American power.  Neither letter supported the use of force or 
offered the US ‘carte blanche’. Their position was more Blairite than pro-Bush, in trying to 
promote multilateral cooperation. 
 European Security: the weakest link? 
Defining security
National security signifies protection of the nation’s people and territories against 
physical assault and in that narrow sense is equivalent to the term defense.  But national 
security also implies protection through a variety of means, of vital economic and 
political interests, the loss of which could threaten the fundamental values and vitality of 
the state50. Since power is widely distributed among the world’s many actors and is of 
limited projectability, none of the participants is entirely sufficient; none of perfectly 
capable of fully satisfying its perceived security needs51. Therefore at one time or 
another, all have found it necessary to resort to one of several devices or approaches to 
compensate for national inadequacies.  States use then collective security, alliances and 
coalitions and international law at one time or another, sometimes simultaneously, to 
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meet their perceived security needs or as means to advance national goals.  Each 
approach can count both successes and both failures in avoiding armed conflict. 
New thinking on security confirms the influence of different spheres.  The 
Copenhagen school of international relations goes beyond the traditional state-centric focused 
definition which attempts to integrate economic, social and environmental threats along the 
political one52. This school of thought moves either up or down to the level of individual or 
human security, or up to the level of international or global security.  Another school of 
thought has remained within a state-centric approach, but deployed diverse terms as modifiers 
to security in order to assess different forms of inter-state security co-operation.  According to 
Karuse however, these different approaches seem to confuse ‘problems’ and ‘threats’.  To the 
social scientist, the concept of security is an essentially contested one with multiple meanings 
and methodological, ontological and epistemological underpinnings.  The concept of security 
is linked to the concept of identity.  To Ernest Gellener, identity is a multi-faceted 
phenomenon derived essentially from a western conception of civilization.  Identity is a ‘more 
or less fluid, more or less constraining resource through which actors identify themselves, 
with its fluidity or constraints depending on the facts of history and societal opinions’.  New 
identities emerge as potential rivals to the state generated outside its control, thus changing 
the nature of security in a wholly new context of political behavior53.
The EU security: Soft versus Hard Security
The European Union has steadily grown as an actor in international affairs, but its 
power and influence are predominantly of soft security argues Fraser54. ‘Soft security’ is 
 
52 Cameron Ross, Perspectives on the Enlargement of the European Union, (Brill 2002), 22 
53 Ross, op. cit., 32 
54 Fraser Cameron, “What They Said: Fraser Cameron on CFSP, ESDP and the Balkans”, Europe, Issue 
397, (June 2000) 
27
basically looking at security in its widest context, that is, trying to promote democracy and the 
rule of law, protect minorities, and sustain economic development.  The EU is by far the main 
provider of humanitarian assistance to the former republics of Yugoslavia and of economic aid 
to Russia, the countries of Central Europe, and the Palestinians.  That has been the focus of EU 
external policy over the last several years. Fraser argues that the EU has to move on from soft 
security to take part in hard security.  That is at least partly a reflection of the fact that the EU is 
much more credible as a commercial and economic power on a world stage than as a political 
player. 
Security arrangements have undergone a period of rapid transition since 1989.  The 
demise of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, the movement towards a common 
foreign policy in the EU, and the triumph of western liberal democratic values have been much 
commented on both sides of the Atlantic55. Pagedas56 argues that between 1991 and 2000, 
Europe witnessed not only the end of the Soviet threat to Europe and its replacement by lower 
level, less intensive crises in the Balkans but also the sharp reduction of U.S. forces in Europe 
and Washington's reluctance to engage in European affairs militarily. But many of the 
certainties characterizing the Cold war were based on fragile underpinnings.  There were 
tensions on both sides.  On the Soviet side, Eastern European countries’ economies demanded 
lots of attention from the Kremlin.  On the Western side, there were tensions between 
Atlanticism and Europeanism and how the United States related to the Wet Europeans and vice 
and versa.  All of those scars impact the current state of European security.  Bipolarity has now 
given way to multipolarity and the fragmentation of the Eastern bloc has presented new 
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problems for the EU.  The EU’s foreign policy project is unsettled both in the sense that it lacks 
a definitive outcome. 
The need to counterbalance an economic power with a political one is the main 
argument put forward by the proponents of a truly common foreign, security and eventually 
defense policy.  There is a need for the EU to speak with a ‘single voice’.  It is in the Union’s 
interest to create strategic space for itself in a world in which US strategies and tactics begin to 
seem very different from those that have been cultivated within the Union over time.  An 
increasing disregard for European participation in strategic decisions that will affect Europe as 
well as the international system makes it harder to pursue European policies alongside the 
United States.  American policy and its own shifting perceptions of its interests57 could become 
a major strategic restraint on the success of the ESDP if the Europeans do not manage “to 
negotiate their way through the rapids” with skill and speed, and also with the courage of their 
convictions.  The European Union Security Doctrine58 drawn up by Javier Solana following the 
Iraqi crisis tries to address the need for a more muscular foreign policy to deal with weapons of 
mass destruction, terrorism and the conflicts of the post-cold war era59. It is the first time in 
fifty-five years that the EU was able to draw up a common doctrine.  The Big Three 
immediately endorsed the doctrine: Britain was anxious to deal with weapons of mass 
destruction, Germany strongly supported it because under an institutional umbrella, and France 
did so because the doctrine spelt how countries, including the US, could not act alone and 
expected to be effective.  The ten candidate countries, the majority of which being Atlanticist 
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welcomed the doctrine because of the explicit support for the US and NATO.  The doctrine 
specifies how the EU must put teeth on its traditional “soft power” tools of political, diplomatic 
and economic pressure. It also focuses on spending more on defense.  
 The ESDP-NATO relationship  
There is a historical relationship between the development of NATO and the EU.  The 
creation of Western institutions such as the European Community and NATO was inspired by a 
notion of security that was both economic and military.  The European Coal and Steel 
Community was created to bind France and Germany in an economic partnership and reduce 
the possibilities of a military conflict. NATO was also established to protect Western Europe 
from the Soviet Union.  The security provided by the EU was facing inward, while the security 
provided by NATO was facing outward60. But both notions of security formation stress the 
importance of a ‘border of order’ provided by the two, which ran through the center of Europe, 
argue Fierke and Wiener.  The ‘iron curtain’ represented a border of order for the EU and 
NATO, in so far as it played an important role in the process of identity formation for both 
organizations.  Through political practice, NATO and EU member states have created a notion 
of belonging to a community with a particular order61. This order was built on liberal 
democratic principles that were, to a large extent, established and sustained by negative 
perception of the communist East.  The collapse of the Soviet Union profoundly challenged the 
specific institutional identities.  Enlargement is not simply a means to extend membership to 
member states from the other block; it also involves incorporating what was the ‘Other’.  
During the Cold War, the self-definitions and normative ideals of both NATO and the EU were 
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defined in the opposition to the East. David Calleo envisions three pan-European Models62 
projecting a different relationship between the EU and NATO in each case. In bi-polar Pan-
Europe, the West claims its Cold war victories, and Western institutions enlarge; NATO and 
the EU include most of the CEECs, and financially helped a crippled Russia while keeping it 
under watch. In the second model, unified pan-Europe, the old East and West of Europe join to 
create a closely integrated Eurasian system.  The EU and NATO extend Eastward, and 
eventually embrace rather than exclude Russia.  In the third model, tripolar pan-Europe, the 
EU, Russia and the United States form three distinct but articulated poles.  Each, while tied to 
the others, remains sufficiently distinct so as not to undermine its own cohesion.  Neither the 
EU nor NATO becomes itself pan-European.  Instead, each remains a critical Western element 
within a larger and looser pan-European superstructure.  The EU for instance extends full 
membership only to Central and East European countries whose political economies are 
sufficiently convergent with the West to be absorbed successfully63. The EU does not imagine 
including Russia but nevertheless develops close economic relations with it, and also with 
former Soviet States.  The US remains present in Pan-Europe through NATO but less as the 
ultimate guarantor of Western Europe against a resumption of Russian aggression or an 
explosion of violence in the Near and Middle East.  The US and Russia cultivate their common 
security interests in the Far East. NATO grows more European and less American-dominated, 
as the EU develops autonomous diplomatic and defense institutions, capable of acting 
effectively either inside or outside NATO.  Russia does not actually join this more European 
NATO but cooperates closely with it through some overarching pan-European security 
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structure64.
Concretely, there are sharp differences over the ESDP-NATO relationship between 
France, Britain and Germany.  True, the confluence of British and French foreign and defense 
policies have helped to create a European Security structure that promises to bridge the long-
standing NATO-EU divide, but the proposals for a common defense before the Convention of 
Europe in November 2002 made by France, Germany and UK illustrate fundamental tensions 
over what kind of links ESDP should have with NATO. The proposals reveal the inherent 
ambiguities over the St Malo initiative launched by Britain and France in 1998.  This was 
supposed to complement the EU's economic power with a defense and security arm.  Instead, 
London saw it as an attempt to improve Europe's defense capabilities under the umbrella of 
NATO.  Paris, on the other hand, saw it as an opportunity for the EU to develop its own 
security policy, with the US-led military alliance kept at a distance.  True, it is often argued that 
the enlargement of both the EU and NATO will bring strategic advantage but functional loss.65 
There is a greater sense in having the two organizations with closely overlapping memberships, 
but that the practicalities of politics within these organizations will make them less manageable 
over time.  However, a close membership overlap must overtime be the loss of one or other of 
these organizations, unless they become functionally different from each other.  Finland and 
Sweden are among non-NATO members now considering NATO membership, so the issue can 
become increasingly problematic.  The revival of the Franco-German axis during the Iraqi 
crisis obviously surprised, since that historically, defense is one of the rare topics where France 
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and Germany have different conceptions66. The 1963 ‘Elysee Treaty’ proposed the idea of a 
European Defense Union, idea rejected by Germany, stating that the treaty should not affect 
Germany’s commitments to NATO. Similarly, when the French thought up the Eurocorps in 
1992, they wanted it autonomous; but the Germans insisted on placing it in a NATO 
framework.  When their security was at stake, the Germans always chose the US rather than 
France, though their overall policy was to be friends with both and a mediator between them.  
But the Iraqi crisis showed that Germany deliberately broke this historical pattern- and chose 
France over the US. 
There are several possible models of European security based on ideology, culture or 
vision of the world.  The relationship between the ESDP and NATO is the best illustration of 
which actors should be involved and how defense and security policies within the EU should be 
led.  The absence of tradition of an independent European security structure combined with 
those ideological debates and the change in World Order affected the carving of European 
Union Security institutions.  It seems there is a constant struggle of what European Security 
needs to achieve and how. 
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CHAPTER V 
DEFINITION OF THE COMMON FOREIGN SECURITY POLICY AND THE 
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY 
The European Security Defense Policy 
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 was the first treaty to contain provisions on the 
EU's responsibility for all questions relating to its security, including the eventual 
framing of a common defense policy.  The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina had definitely 
been an impetus. At the time, the Twelve in August 1991 requested the Western 
European Union to assess options for deployment of a European interposition force of 
30,000 troops without US or NATO support. But in September 1991, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and The United Kingdom vetoed WEU involvement arguing that military 
operations should exclusively remain of NATO competence67. From the point of view of 
military capabilities, Europe’s ability was never questioned: it always has been a political 
and ideological issue.  
The Treaty defined these tasks as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
But the idea of having cooperation in terms of foreign policy had been brought up as early as in 
the 1970ies with the European Political Cooperation (EPC), a mechanism for foreign policy 
coordination among member states that dates form the early 70ies.  EPC transformed into the 
CFSP, like a caterpillar in a butterfly, during the 1991 Intergovernmental Conference (ICG).
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The CFSP was established as the second pillar of the European Union in the 1993 Treaty 
on European Union signed at Maastricht.  The Treaty envisaged that the EU, having no 
military capabilities of its own, would request the Western European Union (WEU) to 
elaborate and implement planned military measures on its behalf.   The 1997 Treaty of 
Amsterdam incorporated into the Treaty on the European Union, the WEU's "Petersberg 
tasks" establishing which types of military operations the EU can undertake.  The most 
extended definition has been included in Article III-309 of the draft Constitution: “joint 
disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance 
tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces undertaken for 
crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization.”68 This laid 
the treaty basis for the operative development of the ESDP.  
The project of developing an independent European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP) was officially launched by the 1999 Cologne European Council.  It had been 
agreed to embark on a Common Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) within the overall 
framework of the CFSP.  The aim of ESDP was and still is to complete and thus 
strengthen the EU's external ability to act through the development of civilian and 
military capabilities for international conflict prevention and crisis management69. With 
the 1998 St Malo Initiative, France and Great-Britain developed "the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces in order to respond to 
international crises." There was a stated desire for the EU to make decisions and 
approve military action where NATO as a whole was not engaged.  The two governments 
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also agreed to develop within the EU institutional framework the ability to deploy a 
European Rapid Reaction Force within sixty days (up to 50,000- 60,000 men).  The 
German government, which occupied the presidency of the EU in the first half of 1999, 
welcomed the French-British declaration and quickly placed the strengthening of a 
common security and defense policy at the top of its EU agenda. 70 At the Cologne 
Summit on 3 June 1999, European leaders agreed on a common defense strategy.  Their 
stated desire to incorporate the dormant WEU into the EU by the end of the year 2000 
was effectively achieved by the Marseilles Declaration of November 2000.  The Finnish 
presidency included the St Malo initiative in The Headline Goal (HG) agreed at the 
Helsinki European Council (December 1999).  The Headline Goal aimed to make 
available to the EU necessary capabilities, including the necessary command and control, 
intelligence, logistics and air and naval assets, to enable the deployment of 60,000 troops 
within 60 days and for a sustainable year.  Given the need to rotate forces the HG would 
require a pool of some 180,000 allowing for forces on stand-by and standing down equal 
to the force deployed. As defined in the Capabilities Development Mechanism (CDM), 
follow-up of the Headline Goal is ensured by a working group of experts, the Headline 
Goal Task Force (HTF), with the support of the EU Military Staff (EUMS). 
The Treaty of Nice (2000) made the St Malo Initiative reality by creating the Rapid 
Reaction Force.   Some Treaty amendments truly reflected the operative development of 
the ESDP as an independent EU project.  We could argue that France and Britain were 
true engines of Defense integration despite their different visions on the role of NATO. 
However, in the midst of the Iraqi crisis, the traditional Franco-British axis was at strain. 
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Instead of stopping European defense integration, France, Germany, Belgium and 
Luxembourg took the lead launch plans for such a EU planning capability also known as 
the Tervuren initiative71. But because of its timing, and the strains in EU-US relations 
over the war in Iraq, the so-called Tervuren initiative was seen in London as a deliberate 
snub to Blair.  German officials at the time said Mr. Blair dropped his earlier reluctance 
to the initiative in exchange for assurances that the club would remain open to other EU 
members at all times.  At the summit held in Berlin in September 2003, despite the Iraqi 
crisis, the three major powers confirmed their attachment to common initiatives.  An 
internal document approved by Britain, France and Germany said: “The European Union 
should be endowed with a joint capacity to plan and conduct operations without recourse 
to NATO resources and capabilities.  Our goal remains to achieve such a planning and 
implementation capacity either in consensus with the 25 (member states) but also in a 
circle of interested partners.” About a year later, EU defense ministers agreed in 
November 2004 to establish 13 so-called battle groups that would be deployable rapidly 
for crisis management around the world outside the NATO framework at the request of 
the United Nations.  The groups, each 1,500-strong (one battalion plus supporting units) 
can be deployed within ten days of the decision to launch an operation and are 
sustainable for 120 days until the termination of the operation or until relief by another, 
longer-term force, deployed by the EU, the UN or regional organization such as the 
African Union. By 2007, between seven and nine battle groups, either national or 
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multinational, would be made available adding 10,500 to 13,500 rapidly deployable 
combat troops for high-intensity operations of the Helsinki Force Catalogue (HFC).72 
The evolution of ESDP does not betray its original purpose, which is to provide 
military and civilian assets for international conflict prevention and crisis management. 
Since the EU seeks to promote non-violent settlement of conflicts, alongside the military 
capabilities, the EU aims to emphasize the development of civilian capabilities which 
focus on the four priority areas (police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil 
protection capacities) adopted at the June 2000 Feira European Council.  US decision-
makers always felt reluctant to see the ESDP expand though ESDP seeks to strengthen 
and consolidate the EU's alliance with the US and Canada within the framework of 
NATO, and also by complying with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 
ESDP's purpose is not to replace but to complement NATO.  National armed forces 
remain under the control of the national commanders and will only be led by a military 
supreme commander for the duration of any EU mission.  
Institutional set-up 
The EU's efforts to assume a political role have been handicapped by awkward 
institutional arrangements, designed to separate the CFSP from the usual EU decision-making 
process with its greater limits on national sovereignty.  The CFSP is not like the Common 
Commercial Policy.  The member states have not pooled responsibility for foreign and security 
policy, let alone defense policy in the EU.  Foreign and Security policy is neither an exclusive 
EU competence nor an area of mixed EU-member state competence.  Instead, CFSP remains 
the responsibility of member states, which have set up an elaborate system at the EU level in an 
intergovernmental pillar of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) to coordinate their 
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policies more closely and to attempt to devise common strategies, reach common positions, and 
take joint actions on a wide range of issues.73 For example, the Commission is fully associated 
with the CFSP but does not have the exclusive right to submit initiatives.  However, it has sole 
responsibility for Community actions in the areas of humanitarian, development assistance, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction and sanctions regulations.  The European Parliament is 
consulted by the Presidency on the fundamental choices of the CFSP and is briefed on how it is 
developing.   The key role goes to the European Council.  The European Council- Heads of 
State and Government and the Commission President- sets priorities and gives broad guidelines 
for EU policies, including CFSP.  The European Council lays down the principles and general 
guidelines for the CFSP, and adopts common strategies.  The Council is presided over for a 
period of six months by each member state in turn, in accordance with a pre-established 
rotation.  The Presidency is assisted by the Council Secretariat and, since Amsterdam, the 
Secretary-General/High Representative.  The High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, has 
three job titles.  First, he is the Secretary General of the European Council, which is the 
principal decision making body in the European Union.  Secondly, he is the Secretary General 
of the Western European Union, which is the quasi defense arm of the European Union.  And 
thirdly, he is the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.  He 
essentially has to deal with the political and military aspects of ESDP.  In other words, he has 
to integrate as much of the Western European Union into the EU as is possible, set up the 
structures, and make sure the member states are meeting their targets on capabilities. 
Improving the institutional efficiency of CFSP/ESDP 
Who needs to be called?
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Externally, the EU often sends three representatives to international meetings, one from 
the presidency, one from the Commission and Javier Solana, the EU’s foreign policy chief. 
Internally, there is no clear political leadership - no single individual able to drive change and 
act as a figurehead for the EU’s citizens.  Secretary Kissinger always wondered whom to call 
when a European foreign policy needed to be discussed.  Internally and externally, there is no 
clear political leadership - no single individual able to drive change and act as a figurehead for 
the EU’s citizens.  Many would recommend for example to merge the post of Commissioner in 
charge of external relations with that the one of high representative; to give him more authority 
over some of the resources the Commission controls.  The difference between him and the 
External Affairs Commissioner is that the Commissioner concentrates very much on financial 
and economic assistance, particularly for the Balkans, which is his number one priority at the 
moment.  Patten, former External Commissioner called himself the “quartermaster of the 
European Union” and Solana is a kind of general.74 The former President of the Commission 
Romano Prodi proposed taking some of the initiative in foreign policy away from member 
states, by placing the EU high representative in foreign affairs within the Commission.  The 
high representative not the states would formulate policy, although EU leaders would decide to 
adopt it or amend it.  Britain and France do not want nonetheless a foreign minister drawn to 
closely to the Commission, and away from the control of member states.75 
Another proposal is to elect a full-time chairman of the European Council (of heads of 
government) to end the farce of the six-month rotating presidency.  This system may have 
worked for the original six member states but it does not now with 15 and cannot with 25.  If 
 
74 Fraser  Cameron (2000) “What They Said: Fraser Cameron on CFSP, ESDP and the Balkans”, Europe,
Issue 397, (June 2000) 
75 George Parker, “EU team moots building foreign policy under one minister”, The Financial Times,
(April 15, 2003) 
40
we expect a US president to take the EU seriously, we cannot provide him with a different 
interlocutor every six months. 76 Such a person would be the spokesman for Europe and the 
proper intermediary for any US President.  His job would be to ensure that Europe would have 
a common policy, consistently pursued and clearly presented: he would be the personification 
of a common foreign policy.77 But the appointment of a Council president could also be 
contentious. “The sort of wrangle behind closed doors seen with other EU appointments would 
do little for the legitimacy of the new post”.  Nor is it obvious that EU citizens, already 
disenchanted with Brussels, would easily relate to a former political figurehead (Tony Blair is 
often mentioned as a potential candidate) of one member state as their leader.  Finally, the 
presidency debate raises important questions about how to improve the efficiency of the 
Council before enlargement to 25 or more members.  There is much more on the agenda than a 
new public face for the EU. 
A third scenario would consist of merging the Presidency of the Council and the 
Commission.  This would serve to locate where the power lies in the Union, thereby setting the 
question of who speaks for Europe.  It would also end the six-month rotating presidency. It 
would bring consistency and coherence to the work of the Council and would ease the fears of 
the smaller member states –that bigger states would have a stronger say.  An integrated 
presidency would also create more synergy between the Commission and Council.  Political 
decision-making would be more closely co-coordinated.  The better management of the 
executive functions of the Union by a single, double-hated presidency would enhance policy 
cohesion.78 
Tensions between the Commission and the Council
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There is a dangerous tension at the heart of CFSDP/ESDP.  It reflects the contradictions 
between the ambitions of EU member governments to play a larger international role and their 
reluctance to move beyond an intergovernmental framework in doing so.79 It results in a there 
constant power struggle between the Commission and the Council, since Member States are the 
primary decision-makers despite few responsibilities assigned to the Commission.  Naturally, 
the Commission would like to see its prerogatives expand.  From a theoretical point of view, 
effective integration in any of these fields would mark the crucial transition from political 
community towards federation.  Under the impact of German unification, EU member states 
recognized the link between European Monetary Union, CFSP and Political Union.  Twenty 
years later, the link between those in terms of integration has not been obvious.  Euroskeptiks 
and intergovernmentalists argue that foreign policy must remain a matter for national 
governments. They refuse to see some responsibility over foreign policy given to the European 
Commission and European Parliament.  Such school of thought champions reinforcing the 
Council to give the EU more legitimacy, because elected national politicians would take 
decisions. 80 The big member states traditionally resist the Commission's latest ambitious 
demands for wider powers at the expense of the Council.  But smaller countries usually despise 
any proposal that appears to challenge the power of the Commission and see it as an attempt to 
undermine the body that protects their interests.  However, the perception that the Commission 
is a secondary decision maker in foreign policy is not entirely true.  The Commission is for 
instance highly involved in the conduct of EU’s trade related external relations.  The heart of 
the problem with the multi-faceted profile of EU’s foreign policy is that the Commission has 
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never been invested with a similar central role in the CFSP 81. Instead, as already explained, 
CFSP remains the responsibility of member states.82 Whereas the Commission enjoys the 
monopoly of the right of initiative in the first pillar, it must leave it in the second pillar to the 
European Council.  The Commission has fought for a long time against its weak role in the 
CFSP, but has lost all major engagements.  Thus it has succeeded neither in getting a 
Commissioner named as a High Representative, nor in having the Policy Unit placed under it. 
(The High Representative is placed under the authority of the Council of Ministers.)  
Nevertheless, the balance of power between the Commission and the Council has been 
slightly shaking since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.   The Commission since Maastricht is ‘fully 
associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security policy field’ (article 
27 TEU) and since Amsterdam, active as part of the reformed troika in representing the EU 
externally.  The Commission through informal and institutional measures increased its 
autonomy vis-à-vis the Council.  For instance, the Commissioners entrusted with foreign affairs 
have always tried to coordinate and focus their efforts.  The Council meetings are attended at 
least by six RELEX Commissioners (from the French relations exterieures).  The Commission 
also takes part in meetings at the working levels of the Council (COREPER and working 
parties).  On the international stage, the establishment of Independent General Directions for 
instance allows the Commission to benefit from network of 150 embassies worldwide.  The 
creation of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism in February 2001 is another measure that allows the 
European Commission to dispatch community funds rapidly in case of an emergency.  The 
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creation of the RRM was a response to the new EWU development in crisis management, such 
as the Situation Center, within the Council. 
But there is a constant feeling that the Commission might be left out and ignored by the 
Council.  The External Relations Directorate General – that coordinates all aspects of the 
Union’s policy towards a country to make sure it does not encroach upon Commission 
responsibilities83- under Commissioner Patten was not a DG trying to push for more 
Commission visibility in the field of CFSP but rather was a DG trying to protect the 
competencies acquired in the past and to deliver efficient and effective policies.  The 
Commission is extremely sensitive concerning any potential loss of competency in external 
relations.  The Constitution draft, while rejected by France and the Netherlands, is another topic 
of concern.  The wording is too vague to determine whether it is going to strengthen or weaken 
the influence of the Commission in the realm of foreign policy.  Indeed, article III-197.3 of the 
Constitution proposes a new EU “external action service.”  This would be comprised of 
Commission officials working alongside diplomats from member states.  The Commission 
currently employs approximately 4,700 staff in delegations around the world.  The goal would 
be to coordinate the EU’s different external activities – trade policy, aid policy, diplomatic 
relations and security policy - in one place.  However, in some cases, the Commission has been 
proactive and crises had been solved under its leadership.  For instance, the signature of the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement between the Commission and the FYROM was a 
strong incentive that HR Solana used to pressure the two parties to reach a deal84. Indeed the 
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SAA gives the FYROM the status of a potential candidate, thus opening up the possibility of 
future accession to the EU.  
Decision-making and voting
The general principles of the CFSP are defined by EU leaders meeting in the 
European Council.  Decisions are taken in the Council of Foreign Ministers, who must 
act unanimously except in the implementation of some joint actions.  Until 1997, each 
Member State had a veto right over the formulation of a common position.  The 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty seeks to resolve that problem with the introduction of the concept of 
"constructive abstention."  Henceforth, a member state that does not like a proposal can 
abstain and not be obliged to apply the resulting decision.  But the abstaining government 
must accept that the decision commits the Union and must refrain from doing anything 
that would conflict with the EU action.85 Dinan argues that these reforms are more 
complicated than the original ones without necessarily being an improvement on them.  
Not only the emergency brake is a throwback to the Luxembourg Compromise but the 
codification of abstentionism and the introduction of various restrictions and 
qualifications seem likely to reduce rather than enhance the CFSP’s effectiveness.  Some 
scholars have speculated that some of the member states are now so desperately attached 
to majority voting as an ideology that they are prepared to pay any price for any sort of 
progress, even if this means sacrificing long-defended principles.86 From a common 
perception, one would expect the major powers having the most difficulty with the 
majority vote concept.  But, France, Britain, Spain and Germany are not alone in having 
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distinct, non-negotiable aspects of foreign policy87. Ireland, Sweden, Austria and Malta 
are unlikely to accept a majority vote committing them to action that breaches their 
neutrality, recalls Minister Shane.  Regarding the use of enhanced cooperation, Ireland, 
Sweden and Finland, three of the EU’s four neutral countries also argue that it would end 
up being too exclusive- a view shared by Poland.  They point out the draft constitution 
stipulates that only members of the Council of Ministers representing the states that 
participate in this core group could adopt acts.88 Finland said it would “not oppose 
enhanced co-operation if it was taken to vote but did not like the idea. Sweden and 
Ireland were reluctant to support it. 
The institutional set-up of CFSP/ESDP has been now reviewed.  “Unless a beautiful 
butterfly, the CFSP/ESDP is cumbersome and colorless and has great difficulty getting of the 
ground” argues Dinan89. Given the divergence of member states’ foreign and security policy 
interests and orientations and the weakness of CFSP instruments and mechanisms, the CFSP 
cannot be as formidable as its name implies.  It is a concern that the CFSP at fifteen is not very 
efficient: absorbing ten new members might worsen it.  In our following chapter, we are going 
to specifically look at the practical implications of having our ten members involved in 
ESDP/CFSP operations and how their involvement might benefit or hamper the efficiency of 
European Union security structures.
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CHAPTER VI 
TESTING AND FINDINGS 
 Findings 
The state of European security and the quality of its institutions have been now 
presented as well as the problematic relationship between NATO and ESDP.  The stakes 
of enlargement are crucial for the future of the EU and the big bang accession 
considerably modifies the balance of European power: it impacts current Member States, 
European institutions and new entrants themselves.  Now, the practical effects of 
accession on the current EU security structure need to be discussed.  Despite a negligible 
involvement on the ground and an expected minimal security interest, the accession of 
New Member States has an impact on the security of European Union, states the theory. 
As already presented in Chapter I, the hypotheses are the following:  
H0: The involvement of New Member States in CFSP/ESDP is negligible and does not 
affect the outcome of ESDP operations.  
H1: The involvement of new member states in ESDP operations is significant because it 
their national security. 
H2: The involvement of new member states in ESDP operations is significant because it 
translates the willingness to be part of European Security.  
The questionnaire had been sent to three institutions per country: the embassy to the  
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United States in Washington D.C., the European Union section of the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs and the permanent representation to the European Union in Brussels. 
Names of potential respondents had been identified on the three websites.  Usually, the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs has a link for the Permanent Representation in Brussels as 
well as embassies since they depend from the Ministry.  The goal was to obtain the most 
official response possible.  All of the mentioned institutions represent the official voice of 
their country.  When the questionnaire got sent, officials form one institution did not get 
informed that official from the other two institutions were also contacted.  It was however 
expected that institutions might communicate with each other.  For anonymity reasons, 
too much detail on who responded cannot be displayed.  However, it is interesting to note 
that one country sent its responses copying officials from the other institutions.  All the 
countries responded, sending two questionnaires except Slovenia for reasons mentioned 
in the questionnaire itself (one questionnaire) and Czech Republic sending three 
questionnaires (case where two separate institutions sent their response).  The condensed 
results of the questionnaire are presented as follows: each country is abbreviated by its 
first three letters, and the name of the operation is associated with an underscore. 
HUN stands for Hungary the name of the operation and added the name of the operation 
next to it. HUN-ALTHEA means participation of Hungary to EUFOR-ALTHEA, HUN-
EUPM means participation of Hungary to operation EUPM. 
LAT stands for Latvia and the operations are EUPM and EUJUST-THEMIS (EU 
Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Georgia) (code LAT-EUPM and LAT-EUJUST 
THEMIS). 
SLO stands for Slovenia, and the operation is EUFOR (code SLO-EUFOR).  
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EST stands for Estonia and the chosen operations are EUPM and ALTHEA (code EST-
EUPM, EST-ALTHEA). 
CZE stands for Czech Republic and the Czech authorities returned three questionnaires for 
the following operations: EUPM, EUFOR-ALTHEA and EUJUST LEX (EU Integrated 
Rule of Law Mission for Iraq) (codes CZE-EUPM, CZE-ALTHEA, CZE-EUJUST LEX). 
For some questions, the respondents added a comment. Each comment following the name 
of an operation is italicized since it is a direct quote from a respondent.  
1. How many troops does your country have involved with this operation? How long 
have you been there?  
0-100 
EST-EUPM, EST-ALTHEA, CZE-EUPM, CZE-ALTHEA, CZE-EUJUST LEX, LAT-
EUPM: ‘Currently there are 3 (from 28 April 2006 – 2 persons) Latvian State police 
representatives but until the end of 2005 there were 4 policemen – as the mandate of the 
EUPM mission has ended in December 2005 and our experts have been in field for 2 
years Latvia decided to rotate its personnel for the EUPM follow-on mission. The 
mandate for current mission (and also for the Latvian experts) is 2 years). LAT-
EUJUST: ‘had 1 rule of law expert there – a judge for full mission, which is 1 year. His 
work was appreciated very much both by the EU and by the Georgian authorities, 
especially because he speaks Russian and could communicate with local authorities’ 
representatives without an interpreter).’ 
SLO- ALTHEA: ‘94 troops in EUFOR as of today. We participate in EUFOR ALTHEA 
since the beginning of the operation in late 2004. We participate also before within IFOR 
and later SFOR, which transform to EUFOR Althea’. 
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100-500: HUN- EUPM, HUN- ALTHEA 
500-1000 
1000 and over 
2. What are the main assignments of your troops other there? 
Peacekeeping: HUN-ALTHEA, SLO-ALTHEA, EST-EUFOR, CZE-ALTHEA, EST-
ALTHEA 
Compliance with International Treaties: 
Police: HUN-EUPM, EST-EUPM, CZE- EUPM, HUN-EUPM, SLO-ALTHEA, HUN-
EUPM, LAT-EUPM:  ‘In line with the general objectives of the Paris/Dayton Agreement, 
EUPM seeks to establish sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership in 
accordance with best European and international practice. It does so in particular 
through monitoring, mentoring and inspection activities.’ 
Assistance Local Authorities: LAT- EUJUST THEMIS, SLO-ALTHEA 
3. Was your country involved in this operation before or after accession?
Before accession: EST-EUPM, HUN-EUPM, LAT-EUPM, SLO-EUFOR 
After accession: HUN-ALTHEA, EST-ALTHEA, LAT- EUJUST, CZE-Althea CZE-
EUPM 
 4. At what stage of the operation did your country get involved?
Planning: HUN-ALTHEA, EST-ALTHEA, SLO-EUFOR 
When the fields operations began: HUN-EUPM, EST-EUPM, HUN-EUPM, LAT- 
EUJUST, SLO-ALTHEA, CZE-Althea, CZE-EUPM 
After the fields operation began: LAT-EUPM 
50
5. Would you consider that your country is an essential actor in the decision-making 
of the conduct of the operation?
Not important 
Somewhat important: EST-EUPM: ‘as we are member state of the EU’, EST-ALTHEA 
H2- EUPM C1Althea CZE-EUPM, CZE-EUJUST LEX 
Very important: LAT-EUPM: ‘Taking into account that decision regarding ESDP 
missions has to be unanimous’, LAT- EUJUST THEMISSLO_EUFOR HUN-EUFOR 
HUN-EUPM: ‘Every country (actually 25) is important in the decision-making, since it is 
taken unanimously’.
6. What kind of military presence do you have there? Please specify how large for 
each category
Army: HUN-EUPM: ‘144 (military and police components’, EST-ALTHEA: ‘32
troops’, CZE-ALTHEA, SLO-ALTHEA 
Navy 
Air Force: CZE -ALTHEA 
Other: CZE EUJUST LEX: ‘It is not a ESDP military operation’. LAT-EUPM: ‘This is 
a civilian mission thus we don’t have any military presence there in a context of this 
particular mission. However Latvia has 3 National armed forces representatives (until 
the end of this year) in BiH within EU military operation EUFOR ALTHEA’. Same for 
LAT- EUJUST 
7. What is your financial contribution to the total cost of the operation?
0-20%:  HUN-ALTHEA, EST-EUPM, EST-ALTHEA, HUN- EUPM, LAT- EUPM: 
‘LV State police expenses in 2004 for 4 policeman deployment in mission were 
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approximately 272 428.00 euro, I suppose it goes under this position’, SLO-ALTHEA, 
CZE-ALTHEA, CZE –EUPM, CZE-EUJUST LEX 
20-50%  
50% and more    
Other: LAT-EUJUST THEMIS: not familiar with expenses for this mission as the 
mission salary and per diems were paid from the CFSP budget and Latvia had to pay for 
expert’s travel expenses, insurance. 
8. Was the participation to this operation relevant to the security of your country?
No: LAT- EUJUST-THEMIS 
Somewhat: EST- EUPM, EST- ALTHEA, HUN-EUPM, LAT- EUPM: ‘not very much 
however the information about our policemen participation in EU mission had resonance 
in mass media thus the reputation (sense of security from police?) of our State police 
could increase)’,  CZE-ALTHEA, CZE-EUPM, CZE-EUJUST LEX 
Yes: HUN-ALTHEA, SLO-ALTHEA: ‘The stability of the neighboring Balkan's region 
is of most importance for the security of our Country and broader – of EU and Europe.’ 
9. Was your participation relevant to the security of the European Union?
No  
Somewhat: CZE-ALTHEA, CZE-EUPM, CZE-EUJUST LEX 
Yes:  HUN-EUPM, HUN-ALTHEA, EST- EUPM, EST- ALTHEA, HUN- EUPM, 
LAT- EUPM: ‘As the EU Police Mission in BiH represents further tangible evidence of 
the development of the ESDP and of the EU's contribution to the international 
community's efforts to promote stability and security and as it was the first ESDP 
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operation launched by the EU (in 2003) our contribution is relevant to the common 
security)’, SLO-ALTHEA 
10. Did the EU authorities influence your decision?
No: HUN-EUPM, EST-EUPM, EST-ALTHEA, LAT-EUJUST, SLO-ALTHEA, CZE-
ALTHEA, CZE-EUJUST LEX 
Somewhat: CZE-ALTHEA, CZE-EUPM, LAT-EUPM: ‘The only case when EU 
authorities somehow influenced our decision regarding participation in this mission was 
the acknowledgement letter from the Head of Mission regarding our policemen work 
there and an invitation to second personnel for next 2 years. All following decisions were 
made independently at national level.’  
Yes 
11. Besides CFSP officials, have officials from other EU institutions influenced your 
decision to participate?
No: HUN-ALTHEA, EST- ALTHEA, HUN-EUPM, LAT- EUPM, SLO-ALTHEA, 
CZE-ALTHEA, CZE-EUPM, CZE-EUJUST LEX. 
Somewhat 
No: EST- EUPM 
12. If yes, which institutions influence your decision to participate?
The European Commission  
The European Parliament  
Other 
13. Has your country consulted other Member States about the decision to 
participate in this operation?
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No: HUN-ALTHEA, EST- EUPM, EST-ALTHEA CZE-EUPM CZE-EUJUST LEX 
Somewhat: SLO-ALTHEA: ‘To assure the right approach and deployment of troops 
which are needed in some operation, there is always important to consult with other 
operation participants / countries in a sense of military, political, intelligence situation 
and cooperation. About influencing on decision whether to join operation or not, the 
decision is taken autonomously within the government. HUN- EUPM CZE-Althea CZE-
EUPM 
Yes 
Comment: LAT- EUPM / LAT-EUJUST THEMIS: ‘(p.s. I can’t comment as I didn’t 
work with these issues at that time. But in general it is each country’s independent 
decision whether to take part in mission or not’. 
14. If yes, how many member states have you consulted?
0-5: HUN- EUPM      CZE-ALTHEA                                                                                                                                                                                   
5-10 
10-15 
Comment: SLO-ALTHEA: ‘Depends what you define under "consulted". In regard to 
mil-to-mil consultations we did consult all (or majority) of the countries which 
participate in EUFOR’. 
15. Has your country consulted other New Member States about its decision to 
participate?
No: HUN-ALTHEA, EST-EUPM, EST-ALTHEA, CZE-ALTHEA, CZE-EUPM, CZE-
EUJUST LEX 
Somewhat: HUN- EUPM, SLO-ALTHEA: ‘same explanation as 13.’ 
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Yes 
16. If yes, how many other New Member States have you consulted?
0-3: HUN- EUPM 
3-6 
6-10 
Comment: SLO-ALTHEA: ‘Same explanation as 14’. Estonia: 
‘I would like to turn your attention to couple of aspects relating to this 
subject. First, about the consultations with other member states of the EU 
on taking part in different operations (questions 13-16) - I marked  
that we did not consult with other partners, however, on unofficial level and  
also at bilateral meetings we have consulted with other states, including the 
host-countries. There have been no special consultations; the subject of 
operations has been just one among other subjects on the agenda.  
Therefore, it is very difficult to determine, how many member states we consulted 
with.’ 
17. How will your involvement affect your national security in the near future?
It will not affect it:  LAT- EUPM: ‘Will not affect our national security directly but see 
Q8’, LAT- EUJUST THEMIS, CZE-ALTHEA 
It will affect it somehow: EST-EUPM, EST-ALTHEA, HUN-EUPM, SLO-ALTHEA: 
‘The stability of our neighborhood will increase our national security in the near future 
as well on the long term. CZE-EUPM CZE-EUJUST LEX CZE-ALTHEA (conflicting 
opinion).’ 
It will affect it a lot: HUN-ALTHEA 
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18. Do you think that the CFSP/ESDP was the most appropriate framework to 
handle this operation? 
No 
Somewhat: HUN-EUPM: ‘but did not address all the concerns of the mission’ 
Yes HUN-ALTHEA: ‘Yes – As a transition from NATO to EU, EUFOR represents good 
example of Berlin + model of cooperation and interoperability of the forces with the 
stress on peace- and institution building mechanisms’.  EST- EUPM, EST- ALTHEA 
LAT- EUPM : Taking into account that there are/were many different actors in BiH 
already) LAT- EUJUST THEMIS, CZE-EUJUST LEX, CZE-ALTHEA, CZE-EUPM 
19.If not, what do you think would have been a better framework? 
NATO 
The UN 
A combination of the EU and NATO 
A combination of the UN, NATO and the EU 
A combination of the UN and NATO 
Other: SLO-ALTHEA: ‘EUFOR-ALTHEA is the "successor" of the SFOR, which means 
NATO, which is, besides UN, present in Sarajevo today as well.  The right framework is a 
combination of the UN, NATO, EU and OSCE, with the right cooperation level and 
complementarities on the field.’
20. Generally, do you think the ESDP/CFSP is the right structure to address the 
needs of EU security?
No 
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Somewhat: LAT- EUPM: ‘From civilian crisis management perspective yes – it is my 
personal view!’, L2 EUJUST SLO-ALTHEA: ‘Somewhat in the complementarities with 
NATO’, CZE-ALTHEA.  
Yes: HUN-EUPM, EST-EUPM: however other options NATO, OSCE and UN have to be 
considered EST- ALTHEA, HUN-ALTHEA, CZE-EUPM, CZE-ALTHEA (conflicting) 
21. What other operations are you involved with?
EUFOR-ALTHEA: HUN, EST, SLO, CZE, LAT 
EUPM: HUN, EST, CZE 
EUPM Proxima (FYROM): HUN, EST, CZE, LAT: “1 policeman but till the end of 
2005, we had two”. 
EUJUST LEX Mission for Iraq: HUN, SLO: ‘presence with NMT-I’, CZE, LAT: ‘We 
had 1 human rights lector in EUJUST LEX mission who participated in 2 Senior 
Management Courses organized by Denmark’. 
EUPOL Kinshasa 
EUSEC DR Congo: HUN, SLO:  ‘probably soon’. 
EU Support to AMIS II (Darfur): HUN: ‘financially’, SLO: ‘probably soon’. 
Comment from Latvia: ‘also in Georgia (Although the mission has ended we had 1 rule 
of law expert (a judge) there who also was invited to continue work for 6 months 
(September 2005 – March 2006) as rule of law expert in EU Special Representative office 
in South Caucasus.)  Latvia also has 6 experts (5 border guardians and 1 customs 
inspector) in EU border assistance mission on Moldova-Ukraine border, however it is 
not ESDP mission (European Commission’s mission)’. 
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Comment from Estonia: ‘There are more ESDP operations going on: Assistance Mission 
in Rafah (Palestine), Border Assistance Mission in Moldova/Ukraine, Police Assistance 
Mission EUPOL COPPS (Palestine), Aceh Monitoring Mission (Indonesia). Estonia is 
taking part in all of them except Aceh Monitoring Mission’. 
22. Among the operations you are involved with, would you consider that one or 
some is/are more important than others?
No:  HUN- EUPM, CZE-ALTHEA (Conflicting) 
Somewhat: HUN-ALTHEA, EST- EUPM, EST- ALTHEA, LAT- EUPM: ‘more 
important for Latvia to participate and to ensure stability in neighboring countries and 
region’.  
More important: CZE-ALTHEA, CZE-EUPM, SLO-EUFOR: ‘depends on the size and 
stage of the conflict, but each has its specific’.  
23. If another operation is more important, please rank the following reasons
National Security Interest HUN-EUPM, EST- EUPM, EST-ALTHEA, CZE-ALTHEA 
CZE-EUPM 
Military Presence: CZE-ALTHEA, CZE-EUPM 
Financial Contribution: CZE-Althea CZE-EUPM 
Other: LAT- EUPM: ‘making decision regarding participation in any mission is taking 
into account regional criteria and our contribution’s efficiency criteri).’ 
SLO-ALTHEA: ‘Do not know how to rank e.g. Military Presence – is this meant as our 
perception of importance by sending MP in the conflict territory? Reasons of importance 
cannot be defined that easily, as I said, there are specific situations of the conflicts. 
Decisions, whether to join or participate in some operation on not, are reached in 
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capitals after consideration of many criteria like: national interest, alliance 
opportunities, current presence of international forces there, countries availability of 
resources/capabilities etc.’  
Additional comments from Slovenia: ‘Slovenia considers its contribution to be most 
effective in the region of the Balkans because of its sensitive stage of stabilization.  We 
pay a lot of importance on regional cooperation for strengthening transition and 
transformation in Europe. We are active in several peacekeeping operations round the 
world (EUFOR, ISAF, KFOR, UNTSO, NMT-I) but EUFOR is the only EU lead 
operation in which we participate. Therefore I fill up only one Questionnaire’. 
The following section summarizes and points out the main findings of the 
questionnaire. Question 1: The question on number of troops involved shows some 
disparities but all of our respondents have something on common.  The countries did not 
commit more than 150 troops.  The choice of civilian missions does not facilitate the 
comparison since civilian missions usually involved fewer troops than military ones.  The 
scope of operations differs drastically.  EUJUST THEMIS is rather small compared to 
EUFOR ALTHEA for example. 
Question 2: The interesting aspect of this answer is the non choice of ‘compliance with 
international treaties’, usually a reason to declare war.  However, the goals of the mission 
have been established by treaties or agreements: the objectives of EUPM were 
established by the Paris/Dayton Agreement.  It also shows that helping local authorities 
through law and order is the primary objective of ESDP operations and stresses the 
civilian flavor of most ESDP operations even when they involve military troops. 
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Question 3 and 4: For one operation out of two, the countries got involved before 
accession.  It means that there was an interest for them to be involved and there was an 
interest for the Union to ask them to participate.  A possible reason could be the 
geographic proximity but it is not true in the case of Latvia and Estonia: both of them got 
involved with EUPM before accession.  We assume that their participation was necessary 
for logistical support.  Now the participation related to the stage of the operation shows 
that our countries did not take part in the planning phase except for operation ALTHEA. 
Question 5: All of the responding population considers itself important actor in the 
decision-making due to ESDP decision-making mechanisms.  Every country is important 
in the process since decisions regarding ESDP missions have to be taken unanimously, 
comment stressed that two respondents.  To the population, it is important to stress that 
they are not secondary decision makers. It is a rule as soon as you join the club. As non- 
members, the countries have not been necessary involved in the planning but as 
members, their decision counts. 
Question 6: Mostly, the presence is army and police. As we mentioned early, EUJUST 
LEX and EUJUST THEMIS are civilian operations. The only country with Air Force 
involved in these operations is the Czech Republic in BiH. 
Question 7: the budget confirms a minimal involvement since all of them checked the 
first bracket 0-20%. 
Questions 8 and 9 are the most interesting findings of the questionnaire. Question 8 asks 
whether the participation to the operation was relevant to the security of the country or 
not. It would have been expected ‘mostly no’ because the only neighboring situation is 
Slovenia with EUFOR. But the majority is somewhat-yes (six somewhat, two yes). The 
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Czech Republic sees its involvement in Iraq as important for its security for instance. The 
comment of Slovenia on the fact that the Balkans stability is not only important for 
Slovenia but also for the whole continent shows that new members go beyond their own 
security and value a sense of European Union security. Question 9 reinforces the message 
from Slovenia. New members see their involvement in ESDP operations as essential to 
the security of the European Union, which validates the hypothesis stating that their 
impact is significant. It reflects the ‘esprit de corps’ mentality and an understanding of 
the significance of ESDP missions.  
Questions 10, 11 and 12: For a majority, the EU did not influence the decision of the 
responding countries to participate, though the decision to launch an ESDP operation is 
taken unanimously. The only somewhat is from Latvia where the Head of the mission 
recognized the performance of their police personnel and invited them to commit for a 
longer period. It is hard to believe that no representative from the CFSP Secretary had 
any influence. 
Question 11 supports this finding. According to the respondents, not a single official 
from any other institutions has influenced their decision to participate. Meaning no one 
from the Commission, which as a reminder was closely involved with their accession, or 
the Parliament influenced their decision. Question 12 has then no point since none of  the 
institutions influenced the respondents. 
Question 13-17: This series of questions supports and at the same time contradicts the 
precedent questions dealing with the involvement of institutions. For five operations, 
there had not been any consultation with other member states. For three operations, there 
has been somewhat consultation, and for two there has been consultation. It would have 
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been expected that for planning reasons (as explained by Slovenia) or risks and 
opportunities of such involvement, each of our participants would consult with other 
member states. But the other argument presented by Latvia is ‘that it is each country’s 
independent decision whether to take part in mission or not). A third option exposed by 
Estonia stating that there are consultations and bilateral meetings with other states, 
including host countries.  But what is striking here is the fact that Czech Republic is the 
only respondent that claims military consultations with all the other member states. 
Another interesting finding from Question 13 is the rather minimal level of consultation 
with ‘similar’ states. New Member States did not really consult each other about getting 
involved, except Slovenia, Czech Republic and Hungary for EUPM. Hungary specifies 
that this consultation has been done with less than five members only. 
Question 17: For eight operations, the involvement will affect the security of the country, 
for one operation, it will affect it a lot, and for only two operations, the involvement will 
not affect the respondents’ security a lot. As expressed before, new member states see 
their involvement in ESDP operations as important for their security. 
Questions 18, 19 and 20: The respondents praise the quality of CFSP as a framework for 
the operations at hand but still value the cooperation on the ground with other 
organizations. The CFSP according to our respondents is not entirely autonomous: it did 
not necessarily ‘address all the concerns of the mission’, represents a good transition 
following NATO, and remains above all good at ‘peace and institution building’, 
implying that ESDP is still not perceived as a true military power. Slovenia offers a good 
summary. ‘The right framework is a combination of the UN, NATO, EU and OSCE, with 
the right cooperation level and complementarities on the field’. To sum up: the more 
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multilateral, the better. It still shows based on the responses from 18 that there is no full 
trust in CFSP to handle security concerns, that CFSP remains is above all a civilian 
power and the respondents like the fact that there is usually support from other 
organizations on the ground, such as NATO or OSCE. 
Question 21: the respondents are involved in numerous operations. One of the criteria for 
selection was a minimum of two operations for each respondent. The table shows that the 
respondents are involved in almost each operation and that they are planning to get 
involved in more operations. Another interesting finding is that the size or military power 
is not a determining factor for participation. Estonia and Slovenia are small states, and 
they are involved in almost every single ESDP operation. Some other operations could 
have been included such as Assistance Mission in Rafah (Palestine), Border Assistance 
Mission in Moldova/Ukraine, Police Assistance Mission EUPOL COPPS (Palestine), 
Aceh Monitoring Mission (Indonesia). Finally, it is striking that the respondents have 
such an interest in being involved in a far abroad: Iraq, Congo and Sudan. It shows that 
the new member states have a true interest in promoting the ideals of European security 
in the far abroad, beyond neighboring countries or traditional zones of influence. 
Questions 22-23: seven responses for somewhat important and more important are 
counted.  Latvia offers an explanation stating that geographic proximity makes some 
operations  more important than others. But Slovenia has a more subtle answer: it always 
depends on the size and stage of the conflict. The assumption is  that the more serious the 
conflict is, the more important the operation gets. The last question looks at possible 
causes for importance. For five operations, it is a matter of national security interest, 
which confirms the suggested explanations provided in question 21. The Czech Republic 
63
rates importance according to the logistical involvement: military presence and financial 
contribution are the main attributes for importance. Slovenia once again offers a 
meaningful contribution: the decision of sending troops is a result of the consideration of 
a set criteria such as national interest, alliance opportunities, current presence of 
international forces there, country availability of resources and availability. 
To conclude, some important findings of the questionnaire need to be summed up. 
The questionnaire validates the fact that the involvement on the ground is negligible. It is 
true from a logistical perspective, looking at the number of troops (usually between 0 and 
100) and the budget contribution between 0 and 20%. However, it also validates the fact 
that the significance of their involvement is far from being negligible. The responding 
population thinks that their involvement in these operations is crucial not only for their 
security but for the EU security and for the region where they are involved. It is not 
surprising that most of the respondents chose EUFOR-ALTHEA and EUPM as 
operations because it is in the neighborhood and the stability of the Balkans is capital to 
the whole Union. There is a true sense of serving the purpose of European Security by 
being involved not only in the neighboring regions but also in the far abroad. The 
responding population does not hesitate to get involved in the far abroad. The perception 
stating that the security within Europe protected from possible threats such as the Russia 
or unbalanced neighborhood is not necessarily true. New Members act now as entirely 
part of the EU and have an urgency to be involved in the far abroad.  
Finally, there is still a very unique perspective about the perception of 
CFSP/ESDP as a security actor. True, CFSP/ESDP is somehow the right framework to 
tackle security threats but not necessarily in a military way and not alone. NATO remains 
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an essential actor to handle security, and CFSP/ESDP seems very effective for civilian 
missions, such as police or rule of law. When operations are larger, the respondents think 
that other organizations need to be involved (Questions 13-17). 
 Validation of the findings with hard data.
The findings and responses need to be then validated with hard data. The used 
hard data are more official data and descriptions of the chosen operations. Based on fact 
sheets from the European Union Council, the WEU and the research done by the Institute 
for Security Studies based in Paris, information is gathered on the four chosen operations: 
EUPM, EUFOR-ALTHEA, EUJUST THEMIS and EUJUST LEX. The background 
information, the size, the budget and the number of troops involved give a framework to 
truly measure the involvement of the responding population.  
EUPM European Union Police Mission Bosnia Herzegovina
Launched on 1 January 2003, the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina represents the EU’s first-ever civilian crisis management operation 
under ESDP. Taking over from the United Nations’ International Police Task Force 
(IPTF), which had been in place since December 1995, the operation aims at supporting 
the local authorities in training their police forces to the highest European and 
international standards.  531 police officers – about 80 per cent from EU member states 
and 20 per cent from third states – perform monitoring, mentoring and inspection 
activities. The EUPM has a mandate for 3 years and an annual budget of €38 million, of 
which €20 million are financed from the Community budget90. The EUPM, whose 
 
90 Giovanni Grevi and others. “ESDP Operations”, Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss-
eu.org/esdp/09-dvl-am.pdf (2003), 2 
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headquarters are located in Sarajevo, is divided in three departments, namely Operations, 
Planning and Development, as well as Administration and Support Services.  In addition, 
the EUPM has been planned in such a way as to work alongside the Bosnia Herzegovina 
police force. It monitors and advises on all aspects of policing activities. The main 
objectives of EUPM are the following91:
 Developing police independence and accountability by: de-politicising the police; 
strengthening the role of directors of police/police commissioners; monitoring 
performance of these officials; promoting transparency;  
 fighting organized crime and corruption by carrying out a joint strategy with the 
Office of the High Representative (OHR); supporting the local police with operational 
capacities; strengthening the investigative capacity of the local police; supporting the 
establishment of a state level police agency (SIPA);  
 Financial viability and sustainability of the local police by: supporting the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the local police; carrying out a financial audit of the affordability of 
local police forces; supporting efforts which lead to increases in police officers' salaries;  
 Institution and capacity building by: focusing on management capacity; supervising 
the establishment of local recruitment and promotion procedures; consolidating state-
level agencies such as the SBS and SIPA.   
The goals of the mission are mainly civilian as Latvia reminded it in the questionnaire.  
Such an operation does not need heavy military equipment by definition and despite the 
civilian nature of the operation the new member states have not committed many troops. 
 
91 The WEU Assembly, The Interparliamentary Security and Defence Assembly, “The European Union in 
the Balkans: Althea and other operations”, Document A 1919, http://www.assemblee-
ueo.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2005/1919.html, (November 9, 2005) 
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The new member states represent 7% of the whole force, and account for only 8% of the 
EU troops (see table below). It definitely confirms that the logistical involvement is very 
negligible.  There are even more troops from third countries than New Member States. 
The involvement of third states illustrates the capacity of the EU to keep non member 
under its leadership. The nature of the testing unfortunately does not provide any 
explanation on why new member could commit a limited number of troops in a civilian 
operation. However, the structure of the operation confirms three reasons new members 
would commit to such an operation. As already mentioned, they believe in the civilian 
capacity of the European Union. Second, the participation of the United Nations as the 
original framework gives legitimacy to the operation and more generally, they do not 
mind working with other countries.  
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TABLE I: Number of Troops in Operation EUPM 
EU Member States before 
May 1, 2004 
EU Member States, after 
May 1, 2004 
Non Member 
States 
Austria: 7 Czech Republic: 6 Bulgaria: 3 
Belgium: 10 Cyprus: 4 Canada: 6 
Denmark: 14 Estonia: 2 Iceland: 3 
Finland: 23 Hungary: 5 Norway:8 
France: 85 Latvia: to be deployed Romania: 9 
Germany: 83 Lithuania: 2 Russia: 5 
Greece: 11 Poland: 12 Switzerland: 4 
Ireland: 5 Slovakia: 4 Turkey: 12 
Italy: 47 Slovenia: 4 Ukraine: 5 
Luxembourg: 3   
Netherlands: 37   
Portugal: 10   
Spain: 22   
Sweden: 15   
United Kingdom: 70   
TOTAL: 442 TOTAL: 39 TOTAL: 45 
Source: Deployment of Police Officers, 24 April 2003, EUPM MHQ / Personnel Office 
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In addition, the EUPM has been planned in such a way as to work alongside the 
BiH police force. It monitors and advises on all aspects of policing activities. EUPM 
personnel are currently operational in a number of strategic locations in BiH. Their 
presence in the country's "central nervous system" ensures not only the full cooperation 
of the local authorities but also a level of monitoring, inspections and advice which will 
undoubtedly have a profound influence on the country's future administration. That 
aspect illustrates how much it is important for new members to strengthen the rule of law 
and have a safe and stable neighbor (comments from Slovenia). Furthermore, the 
EUPM's increasing cooperation with the ALTHEA mission ensures that the EU's role in 
BiH will continue after the EUPM mandate comes to an end 92, and again it gives a 
certain guarantee to the new members that there is a true regional effort to promote 
stability 
EUFOR-ALTHEA
Following the Council Joint Action (2004/570/CFSP) of 12 July 2004, the EU 
launched the military operation Althea on 2 December 2004, following the decision by 
NATO at the Istanbul summit in June 2004 to conclude the SFOR mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH)93. As EUFOR took over from NATO forces, it is carrying out the 
same missions and activities. In fact it can be said that since EUFOR is the same size, has 
the same structure and deploys the same assets on the ground, it is virtually identical to 
SFOR. In accordance with the Dayton/Paris agreement, the objectives of EUFOR 
ALTHEA are to contribute to a safe environment in BiH in line with its mandate, 
required achieving core tasks in the Office of the High Representative’s Mission 
 
92 The WEU Assembly, op. cit., 11  
93 Grevi and others, 6 
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Implementation Plan and the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP).  The EU force 
also provides support, within means and capabilities, to the efforts of High 
Representative and of the international community, in fields such as the fight against 
organized crime and the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement. 
EUFOR-ALTHEA represents the ideal operation for the new members.  It meets all the 
conditions of a legitimate successful initiative for the new members and the respondents. 
EUFOR-ALTHEA is the same as SFOR, a NATO operation, with exactly the same goal 
and same structure. The questionnaire showed how much the respondents were still 
attached to NATO. EUFOR-ALTHEA aims at the compliance of the Dayton / Paris 
Agreement. There is international weight behind the operation including support from the 
United States. In the words of Hungary in the questionnaire: ‘As a transition from NATO 
to EU, EUFOR represents good example of Berlin + model of cooperation and 
interoperability of the forces with the stress on peace- and institution building 
mechanisms’ 
Operation Althea is the largest in size ever launched by the EU, with 5,805 troops 
from almost all member states and a large number of third countries. In all, 33 countries 
contribute to the operation, including 22 EU member states and 11 non-member states, 
including most notably Morocco. Germany and the UK constitute the main troop-
contributors with respectively 1,100 and 950 troops. Other major contributions are from 
France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. The ‘old’ EU member States represent more 
than 80% of the troops. One should note also that traditionally neutral EU countries 
(Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) contribute to the operation, which includes also 
the neutral non-EU member state of Switzerland. The new Member States certainly have 
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more troops involved than in EUPM but still represent only 5% of the total contingent. 
Non-Member States represent about 13% of the total of troops. Common costs for the 
operation are administered by the ATHENA mechanism, by which contributions come 
from member states on a GDP-based key. The total cost of the operation is €71.794.
94 Grevi, op. cit., .7 
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TABLE II: NUMBER OF TROOPS IN OPERATION EUFOR-ALTHEA                                                                                                                                                                
EU Member States before 
May 1, 2004 
EU Member States, after 
May 1, 2004 
Non Member States 
Belgium: 52 Czech Republic: 90 Albania: 71 
Finland: 184 Estonia: 3 Argentina: 2 
France: 463 Hungary: 142 Bulgaria: 36 
Germany: 1014 Latvia: 3 Canada: 3 
Greece: 88 Lithuania: 1 Chile: 23 
Ireland: 51 Slovakia: 4 Morocco: 132 
Italy: 955 Slovenia: 90 Norway: 17 
Luxemburg: 1  New Zealand: 9 
Netherlands: 384  Romania: 120 
Portugal: 237  Switzerland: 23 
Spain: 492  Turkey: 332 
Sweden: 77   
United Kingdom: 706   
Total: 4703 Total: 333 Total: 768 
Source: EUFOR-ALTHEA website, www.euforbih.org
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It adds in a significant way to the EU's political engagement, its assistance 
programs with a view to helping BiH make further progress towards European integration 
in the context of the Stabilization and Association Process. It confirms the strategic 
interest of the New Members to get involved in the stabilization of the Balkans. Slovenia 
returned one questionnaire only based on the assumption that EUFOR ALTHEA is the 
most critical operation for their security.  In terms of chain of command, the Council of 
the European Union takes basic decisions on the operation, assisted by the Secretary 
General of the Council/High Representative for the CFSP. The Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) exercises political control and ensures the strategic direction of the 
operation, under the responsibility of the Council. In turn the EU Military Committee 
(EUMC) monitors its proper implementation95.
Operation Althea is carried out according to the Berlin Plus agreement between 
the EU and NATO. Consultation takes place with NATO on the application of the Berlin 
Plus agreements, and the PSC and the Chairman of the EUMC update NATO on the 
progress of Althea. The link with NATO is important in operational and command terms 
as well as for bolstering the credibility of the EU operation. Once again as expressed I the 
last questions of the survey, the participation of NATO gives credibility to an ESDP 
operation and confirms that New Member still do not blindly follow the EU when it 
comes to military involvement.  However, operation Althea marks a new step in the 
development of ESDP in terms of size and ambition. It also confirms the rising role of the 
EU as a primary European security provider, with ever more responsibility in particular 
 
95 European Union Council, European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “EUFOR fact sheet” 
www.euforbih.org, (2006) 
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for stability in the Western Balkans96. The contrast with European policy a decade ago, in 
1994, could not be greater: EU member states are united and pursue common policy 
objectives. And it does not contradict the idea of having NATO involved. The responding 
countries stand by the European Union’s foreign policy objectives. At the same time, one 
should note two challenges facing the operation. The first is that of credibility – in terms 
of being willing and able to back words with actions - and the second is that of coherence 
– in terms of the ability to weave Althea into the EU’s wider objectives in BiH, including 
the EUPM operation underway since 2003.  
According to a quarterly report issued by the Secretary General and High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy on 4 October 2005 and 
covering the period 1 June to 15 September 2005, the political and military situation has 
remained stable and noted some significant achievements. First of all, there had been a 
milestone agreement on a draft new BiH Defense Law and Law on Army Service signed 
by all Defense Reform Commissioners in 18 July. Furthermore, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) cooperation has continued 
positively since the beginning of 2005. But the most interesting for our study is the 
successful combination of EUFOR ALTHEA and EUPM. Both operations assisted the 
local authorities in maintaining a safe and secure environment over the period of the tenth 
anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre. EUFOR adopted a posture of "out of sight but 
not over the horizon". According to the report, EUFOR, in cooperation with the EUPM, 
continues to support the local police. 
EUJUST THEMIS 
96 Grevi and others. Op. cit., 8 
 
74
The European Union’s has a longstanding effort to bolster peace and security in 
the South Caucasus and to assist in the transition of three states of the region: Armenia, 
Georgia and Azerbaijan97. Since Georgia's independence in 1991, the European Union 
has been one of the biggest donors to the country.  The European Community alone has 
already given more than €380 million since 1992.  The 2003 European Security includes 
Georgia and the South Caucus as part of a ring of well governed countries to the East of 
the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean, with whom the EU can 
enjoy close and cooperative relations, as a strategic objective.  As part of this, the EU 
appointed a Special Representative for the South Caucasus in July 2003.  Additionally, in 
June 2004, the EU agreed to involve the three states in the European Neighborhood 
Policy (ENP).98 
In June 2004, the Georgian Prime Minister invited the EU to assist the Georgian 
government by way of a EU Rule of Law Mission for a one year commitment.  The Joint 
Action 2004/523/CFSP creating EUJUST THEMIS was approved by the European 
Council, and on 16 July, 2004, the mission was launched. It was no surprise since the rule 
of law and the criminal justice system had been a focus of European Community (EC) 
assistance since 2000 under the "Tacis" program99. In the revised Country Strategy for 
Georgia 2003-2006, the rule of law had been identified as one of the core priorities for 
EC assistance, building on lessons learned from assistance in the past and using the 
present momentum of reform in the judiciary.  The objectives of EUJUST THEMIS were 
 
97 Grevi and others. Op. cit., 5 
98 European Union, “Facts on EUJUST THEMIS”, European Union Rule of Law Mission to Georgia, 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/ EUJUST_THEMIS -Factsheet.pdf, (2005), 5 
99 European Union, “Facts on EUJUST THEMIS”, European Union Rule of Law Mission to Georgia, 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/ EUJUST_THEMIS -Factsheet.pdf (2005), 5 
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to assist the Government of Georgia in its efforts to reform the criminal justice system 
and improve legislative procedures.  These improvements sought to align Georgia fully 
with international and European human rights standards. In particular, EUJUST THEMIS 
provided urgent guidance for the new criminal justice reform strategy, supported the 
overall coordinating role of the relevant Georgian authorities in the field of judicial 
reform and anti-corruption; supported the planning for new legislation as necessary; and 
supported the development of international as well as regional cooperation in the area of 
criminal justice. Here, participation is not based on quality of military equipment but on 
expertise of jurists. Latvia sent a judge whose work was appreciated very much both by 
the EU and by the Georgian authorities, because he could speak Russian and could 
communicate with local authorities’ representatives without an interpreter. In terms of 
chain of command, similarly to EUFOR and EUPM, the Political and Security 
Committee exercised, under the responsibility of the Council, the political control and 
strategic direction of the mission.  The mission of a budget of €2,050,000 was executed 
with the expertise and experience of senior professionals through a supportive and 
advisory role to the Georgian authorities. EUJUST THEMIS was the first rule of law 
mission carried out by an ESDP civilian mission and confirms the development of new 
capabilities for the civilian dimension of ESDP. For a small mission, it is interesting to 
see that a small New Member such as Latvia would get involved. As mentioned earlier, 
expertise does not need troops! The mission falls in line with the Feira European Council 
(2000) decision to strengthen such civilian capabilities, especially with regard to the rule 
of law. EUJUST THEMIS reflects also the EU commitment to support the efforts of its 
neighbors in the South Caucasus to create a stable and secure region. The involvement in 
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EUJUST THEMIS was certainly not a top national security concern, but it shows that 
New Member States have a key role in the ENP (European neighborhood Policy) due to 
their former attachments to Russia or juts by geographic proximity. Latvia Seen as a 
success despite a limited scale, EUJUST THEMIS definitely reinforced the credibility to 
the EU in civilian missions, claim made by all the respondents. 
EUJUST LEX
Following the report of the Joint Council/Commission fact-finding mission for a 
possible integrated police and rule of law operation in Iraq, the Brussels European 
Council on 5 November 2004 recognized ‘the importance of strengthening the criminal 
justice system’ in Iraq, in compliance with the respect of human rights100. To this end, 
the summit envisaged that the EU could contribute to the emergence of a stable, secure 
and democratic Iraq through an integrated police, rule of law and civilian administration 
mission.  Following consultation with Iraqi authorities and based on a report of experts, 
as part of the implementation of the EU program of action for Iraq presented in 
November 2004, the operation was launched in the summer 2005. Czech Republic was 
the only country who chose Iraq in the survey.  
The mission was mandated to address the urgent needs of the Iraqi criminal 
justice system by providing training in senior management and criminal investigation to 
high and mid-level officials, with a view to promoting closer cooperation among the 
actors in the domain of criminal justice101. More specifically, the training targets 520 
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judges, investigating magistrates, senior police and penitentiary officers in senior 
management and of some 250 investigating magistrates and senior police in the fields of 
management and criminal investigation.  The mission aims at training 770 persons to be 
over a period of a year.  An amount of €10 million from the EU budget has been intended 
to cover the common costs of the mission.  Member States will contribute training 
courses and trainers. The Czech Republic sent about 100 personnel to contribute to the 
mission. Once again, New Members have legal expertise and support the civilian capacity 
of the European Union. The involvement confirms the importance of being involved in 
the Far Abroad for the New Members, who think it is somewhat important for their 
security. 
The EU is not the only actor providing training to Iraqi officials: in the course of 
2004, NATO has set up a sizeable training mission directed at the military, which aims to 
involve on an annual basis 1,000 officials within Iraq and 500 outside.  The US and some 
EU Member States also conduct training activities.  The EU has taken the lead on the 
reform of the criminal justice sector: a key challenge for the future stability of Iraq, 
considering that no proper criminal justice system existed before the war began in 2003. 
It is an adroit manner for the EU to get involved in an area where it refused to commit 
troops in the first place. It could be argued that New Member States see Iraq as a way to 
express their attachment to the transatlantic cooperation. Earlier in the paper was 
discussed how the unraveling of the Iraqi crisis was a difficult time for the New Members 
who supported the United States initiative but were candidates for accession. The 
involvement of NATO on the ground as already mentioned in other operations is a 
perceived as a positive sign of advanced multilateral cooperation. Czech Republic is also 
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somewhat an outlier in the responding population for its advanced military capacity 
compared to other New Members.  The Czech Republic seems to have an energetic 
agenda to be seen as a main player in ESDP operations:  the Czech contributed airplanes 
to EUFOR-ALTHEA for example. The Czech Republic also sees its involvement as 
critical because the capacity of the European Union to be perceived as an alternative 
credible player in the region and in the Far Abroad in general.  In particular, the 
Commission has set up follow-up options to the ESDP mission under Community 
programs, so as to ensure the sustainability of the justice system and the strengthening of 
the rule of law.  EUJUST LEX is to be set in the context of the major commitment of the 
EU to the reconstruction and stabilization of Iraq, including a €320 million package 
disbursed by the Community in the period 2003/2004, and an additional €200 million 
assistance program for 2005 including support to the economy, civil society and the 
political and constitutional process. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF ENLARGEMENT FOR EUROPEAN 
SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY  
A unique perception of European security and an original foreign 
policy 
The case study of the involvement of new Member States in ESDP operations as 
well as an analysis of the state of European security give an opportunity to further discuss 
the implications of enlargement for European Security and Foreign Policy. With the 
Mediterranean enlargement or the EFTA enlargement, the EU did not have to extensively 
worry about whether the new members would follow its foreign policy or not. There were 
a very few members at the time and even if entrants might have had different perceptions, 
they were still market economies and most of their neighbors turned out to be current EU 
members. This enlargement is different given its scope the historical tradition of the new 
block. The entrants’ foreign policy is by tradition mostly focused on their neighbors 
rather than the wider world102. The involvement in Bosnia Herzegovina, Georgia and 
Moldova confirms it.  However, the trend has been evolving.  It is important for new 
members to be involved
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in their neighborhood but as the question on where else they are involved, it is interesting to 
see that they have a foot in a far abroad such as Iraq and Congo. However, the new members 
do not blindly follow the idea that European security should be autonomous. They still have a 
high opinion of NATO and one should not forget that over the last fifteen years, their priority 
has been the accession to the European Union and NATO.  
The involvement of New Member States in their neighborhood and in the far abroad is 
hard to translate when it comes to further enlargement. Some of the new members could 
become rather ambivalent about further enlargement of the EU. So far, they have publicly 
supported Bulgarian and Romanian enlargement but are more divided over Turkey. Poland and 
Czech Republic have argued in favor of Turkey joining, but others are opposed. The key issue 
is whether the integration of further countries will divert EU funds away from them and 
diminish their status. But the most oppressing issue is definitely their neighborhood. Some new 
member states are already starting to use their membership to deal with non-EU neighbors103.
This enlargement creates new neighbors for the EU such as Russia and Ukraine, and the new 
member states will have their own ‘special interests’, including Polish and the Baltic states’ 
interest in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, Bulgarian interests in the Black Sea region, and 
Cyprus’ relations with Turkey104. The accession of Sweden and Finland in 1994 had led to an
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increased EU interest in northern Europe, as evidenced by the adoption of the Northern 
Dimension Action Plan at Feira in June 2000105. It shows that this enlargement is likely for a 
variety of reasons to keep in the forefront of Union policy its relations with its nearer 
neighbors, and in particular the states of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) in 
the Western Balkans, and the Partnership and Cooperation states to the east, including Russia 
and Ukraine106. The stability of the Balkans is a top priority for the New Member States as 
expressed in the questionnaire by Slovenia and Hungary. As a result, security and regional 
issues are an important aspect of their relations with the EU and impacts the EU’s emerging 
security and defense policy (CESDP) and its relationship with NATO. Security has been a 
reason pushing the CEECs to join the EU. Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania are currently members of NATO and the ten 
entrants are all now full members of WEU107. Slovenia in the questionnaire explained that 
their involvement in the region through Althea is critical to its security but to the whole 
neighborhood in general.  
Geopolitically, the Enlargement raises the question of the political impact of the 
reunification of Europe. The enlarged Europe will be engaged in a process of reshaping Europe 
as a whole and redefining its borders108. The CEECs clearly distinguish between the actual 
security provided by the US through NATO and the prospects for security provided by the 
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EU109. As Joshka Fisher mentioned it: “The US is a world power. The EU on the other 
hand is still a power in the making”110. Most of CEECs elite wonders if France and Germany or 
the EU for that matter can provide their security that they believe they need. As we mentioned 
earlier, perception of the world sharply differs whether you are a Western European or an 
Eastern European. All of new members have complex views about Russia and its relationship 
with the EU. They had different relationships with the Soviet Union during half of a century of 
communism, but there is little nostalgia for a closer relationship with Russia.111Some countries 
got invaded and the three Baltic States got annexed by the Soviet Union. To the CEECs the 
Paris-Berlin axis is not a concern: they are mostly preoccupied by the resurgence of a Berlin-
Moscow axis which brings up painful memories of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact112, and this 
another reason the CEECs sided with the US during the Iraqi crisis versus a French-German-
Russian alliance. The Latvian president remarked in an interview in 2003: “Obviously, in the 
past the Berlin-Moscow axis had terrible consequences for our country and we hope that the 
axis that is now emerging will not be along those lines”. The close friendship between 
Chancellor Shröder and President Putin and the German lack of criticism towards the 
Chechnyan conflict did not help alleviate the concerns. The fear of the Russian specter and the 
concrete existence of NATO tend to make CEECs support NATO rather than the idea of a 
European counterweight to American power. The questionnaire shows that CEECs and Baltic 
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States trust the EU as a civilian crisis management actor but still struggle with the concept of a 
EU as a military power. The findings show that CEECs and Baltic States feel safer when other 
actors are involved with the operation such as NATO or OSCE when it comes to Eastern 
European operations. A common cliché is to perceive New Member as ‘Atlanticist’ no matter 
what. The Iraq war was a special case and support for the US was an unwelcome dilemma for 
countries that want a strong Europe too. As explained earlier, the nature of the support was very 
political since NATO membership was at stake. When it comes to other issues, the CEECs tend 
to side with the EU not the US. They are strongly multilateralist, having suffered from the 
bipolar era. The new members certainly want a solid transatlantic alliance, but also want the 
EU to have an effective foreign policy especially in the Balkans and in the Neighborhood.  In 
addition to Poland’s proposals for developing EU’s Ostpolitik, Hungary and Slovenia want to 
integrate the Balkans politically and economically into the EU.  The enlarged Union’s 
periphery to the East and the South is of diminishing importance to Washington but is of vital 
concern to the new members113. On most international issues, the new members usually align 
themselves with the EU, on the Kyoto protocol, non-proliferation, and the death penalty. They 
usually vote with the other Europeans in the UN. These countries have become increasingly 
‘socialized’ in the EU’s ways of doing business.  Their political classes have grown to think 
like the EU’s current members, including on international issues. However, they are true 
supporters of NATO and multilateralism.  A common fear in current member states such as 
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France is that the new members will be pro-American and seek to turn the EU in a giant 
free trade area, but these countries had much of the economic benefits prior to accession.  What 
the CEECs want from membership is full participation in the political decisions being made in 
the EU including foreign policy, security and defense.  The CEECs do not see a contradiction 
between supporting NATO and advocating effective defense capabilities for the EU. 
Beyond the Headline Goal and the necessity of further military 
cooperation  
Member States are conscious of the need to pursue the transformation of their armed 
forces from territorial defense to expeditionary operations and are taking important steps.  For 
budgetary and efficiency reasons, smaller member states are unable to provide the full range 
of capabilities in their army, navy and air force, and cannot maintain certain capabilities 
unless in cooperation with others.  This is certainly true for the new member states, number of 
which has only just begun transformation.  They do not need to carry full capabilities, as the 
range of necessarily small-scale (and thus inefficient) capabilities would not allow smaller –or 
medium-sized-states to implement autonomous operations, so they are dependent on other 
states anyway – although not all states concerned have yet come to realize this114. That could 
explain why the involvement on the ground is so limited. But being part of the EU and NATO 
at the same time should foster more cooperation. 
Cooperation can entail joint procurement of equipment, pooling certain supporting 
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capabilities (such as logistics) in multinational units and/or creating multinational units and/or 
creating multinational combat units (such as multinational battle groups). Pooling can also 
mean creating collective capabilities that are no longer owned by the participating Member 
States but by the EU as such; this is probably the way forward to acquire capital-intensive 
assets such as space observation. Specialization implies that certain capabilities are no longer 
maintained and/or maintained only through participation in a multinational cooperation. 
Current small member states make the effort. For example, at the same time as reducing its 
number of mechanized brigades from three to two has decided to replace all tracked vehicles, 
including its entire stock of Leopard tanks, by more deployable wheeled armored vehicles; the 
Belgian and Dutch navies have been integrated under a single operational command. There is 
also a consciousness of the need to downsize forces in favor of usability and to deal with 
conscription. 
The problem is with all these national, bilateral and multilateral initiatives is that decisions are 
being made without reference  to any European framework- for the simple reason that apart 
from HG, none exists.  Then the risk is that without coordination, in the end Member States’ 
combined capabilities will represent an incoherent whole, with surpluses of one capability and 
shortages of another, that does not answer the needs of the EU.  What is required therefore is a 
top-down planning and coordination at the EU level, starting neither from the limitations of the 
current HG nor from the comparison with the USA, but from the strategic objectives of the EU.  
The objectives expressed in the European Security Strategy could be translated into more 
detailed, quantifiable military ambitions: how many concurrent operations, at which scale and 
at which level of intensity does the EU want to be able to implement, in view of its 
commitments towards its neighborhood and ‘effective multilateralism’?  On that basis, a 
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comprehensive catalogue of capability requirements could be drawn up that looks beyond the 
HG and could serve as a framework for the further transformation of Member States’ combined 
armed forces as a whole.  For the smaller Member States, who are willing to continue 
transformation, such a framework is indispensable. Since NATO does not offer such far-
reaching integration, the EU is the only option115.
The necessity of a firm and visionary leadership 
It seems that it always come down to a right definition of European security, but since 
there are conflicting views of what European security should be made of, a true leadership is 
vital to the future of European Security. The commitment of the member states towards a 
common security policy needs to be assessed.  For the time being, big member states need to 
show guidance but it is still difficult to figure out where most of them stand and whether they 
have a vision for European security.  After thirty years of membership, the British still cannot 
make up their minds whether they really want to be full participants in the European Union116.
In the Iraqi crisis, Tony Blair had perfect pitch in Washington, but the British Prime Minister’s 
Atlanticist and multilateralist policy, admirable in principle, fell down because of his failure to 
establish a single, strong, coherent European position in prior consultations with Paris and 
Berlin. Britain has tried to play a leadership role in defense issues ‘while signaling both a more 
flexible approach on some sensitive issues such as increased QMV and a readiness to engage in 
bilateral alliances to promote national interests”117. The Anglo-Spanish and Anglo-Italian 
alliances in the approach of the Lisbon agenda and the Anglo-German proposals to make 
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European Councils more efficient were such examples.  Britain has continually called for a 
Europe of Nation States even though Tony Blair has put forward his vision of ‘Europe as a 
superpower, not a superstate’.  Second, French political and administrative elites tend to think 
naturally that what is bad for the US is good for France and they tend to transfer their sense of 
frustration with Washington to their relations with their smaller European partners, be they 
from “old” or “new” Europe.  True French ambition for Europe demands a sense of modesty 
and self-criticism. France is obviously weakened by domestic struggle with any reform 
initiative, the rejection of the referendum and by the end of a political era.  Till 2007, 
presidential election year, France is not expected to provide true leadership. It also depends a 
lot on the German attitude towards European integration. One might wonder if Germany has a 
true ambition for Europe. Ten years ago, people were anxiously asking whether Europe could 
cope with a united Europe. Today, the question should be: can Germany cope with a united 
Europe? Germany needs to pursue new reformist goals as one of Europe’s main driving forces. 
It needs to increase its defense budget to advance the project of enhancing Europe’s military 
capability. But the German stance in the Iraqi crisis showed that Mr. Shröder wants to enhance 
Germany’s European and global role118. The attitude of Mrs. Merkel is much more ambivalent. 
Mr. Shröder shared Mr. Chirac’s views on the need to constrain the power of an increasingly 
unilateral US. He may also have come to share some of Mr. Chirac’s fears of enlargement. The 
French President appears to believe that, in a Europe of twenty-five countries, only some sort 
of core –with France of course playing a preeminent role- can provide backbone and 
leadership.119 The integration process has always been for most of European integration history 
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driven by a strong Franco-German axis. When Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand left 
office though, the Paris-Berlin axis has been in trouble with open disputes over the future 
institutional structure of the Union, the reform of the CAP and the costs of enlargement. 
However, the fortieth anniversary of the Elysee Treaty in January 2003 (Franco-German 
Friendship), Chancellor Schröder and President Chirac made a point of resolving their 
differences on CAP and the costs of enlargement and issued a number of joint declarations on 
major themes at the Convention preparing the European Constitution and above all adopted a 
critical stance vis-à-vis the US position on Iraq. The re-emergence of the Franco-German axis 
was surprising because Chirac has often been ambivalent about the EU and has antagonized 
many old and new member states with his public utterances. Shröder has never displayed much 
enthusiasm or interest for European integration120. Mrs. Merkel is very keen on the Franco-
German axis but seems very open to new members and does not want to antagonize the United 
States, trying to repair a damaged relationship. 
Italy and Spain were traditionally pro-integration countries without seeking any 
leadership role. But under Aznar and Berlusconi, those positions changed especially in regards 
to their strong Atlanticist stance. The Atlanticist position cost somehow the election to Jose-
Maria Aznar (troops in Iraq and backlash from Al-Quaeda). Prime Minister Zapatero anti-Iraq 
stance did not translate in strong leadership on EU issues. The return to power of Mr. Prodi, 
former President of the European Commission will give a stronger European stance to Italy: 
certainly, Mr. Prodi’s performance in Brussels was lackluster, but his experience will bring a 
lot to Italy on the EU stage.  The Benelux was often influential in pushing ideas in the past but 
recent political disputes and the rejection of the Constitution Treaty have reduced the Benelux 
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voice in European Affairs. The Nordic countries have also failed to make much of a mark121.
How active will the new members be in external policy-making? We have seen for instance 
that Poland wants to play a major role in foreign policy due to its size. Poland sent troops in 
Iraq. Poland has been to the fore in advocating the development of a stronger EU foreign 
policy122. Early in 2003, the Polish foreign ministry published a regional strategy for the EU to 
deal with the countries to its East. But even that policy paper was more about the country’s 
immediate neighbors than about Russia. Hungary and Czech Republic have been extremely 
active, participating in many ESDP operations, including far abroad ones, but they cannot 
offset their junior status with size, like Poland. To conclude, the New Member states are still 
too young to provide leadership.                                                                            
Germany, Britain and France are Europe’s indispensable three. Their close co-operation 
is not a sufficient condition for Europe to have a serious foreign and security policy but it is a 
necessary one. As we saw over Iraq, if these three are divided, all Europe will be divided. 
There might be also “contact groups” on the big new challenges facing Europe, such as Iran 
and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. These would always include British, French and 
German representatives but also other relevant powers. In the case of the contact group for the 
Balkan wars in the 1990s, these were Russia and subsequently Italy. New groups might include 
Poland when the issue concerns Eastern Europe, say, or Spain and Italy for North Africa. The 
groups would not be exclusive- but nor would they be open to all who just wanted a seat at the 
table for the sake of national prestige. Membership would have to be earned by proven 
competence, capability and seriousness. Nonetheless, small countries do not like the idea of a 
“directoire” of Europe. Small countries should realize that the only alternative acceptable to 
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them is the lowest common denominator “mush and guff”, or nobody will profit. If the EU’s 
influence in the world is close to zero, theirs will be even smaller. The CEECs have often 
suffered form decisions made by great powers on their behalf123. They know that, to be able to 
choose freely, you have to be on equal terms with your partners. They dread the idea of a 
‘directoire’ of big countries bullying the others into submission. The CEECs do not want to be 
excluded from an ‘inner sanctum’. Moreover, France’s leaders had created resentment over the 
years. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was widespread francophilia in Central 
and Eastern Europe thanks to the dissidents who had spent time in France. But the reluctance of 
President Mitterrand to agree to Eastward enlargement in the nineties, the rift over the 
attribution of votes and seats within the European institutions during the 2000 Nice summit and 
finally the abrupt comments of President Chirac during the Iraqi crisis wiped out the sympathy 
capital for France124.
The European Union does not seem ready to assume its position as a political player or 
only to a certain extent. The adjustments made to the CFSP/ESDP over the last few years are 
insufficient to absorb the CEECs for different reasons. First, the institutional structure of 
European Security is too inconsistent, the authority is fragmented and state bargaining 
influences decisions too heavily which makes the EU ill-adapted to 25 members. Ideologically, 
there are certainly conflicting perceptions of what European security and it is acceptable given 
different traditions and political cultures but those visions do not necessarily take into account 
the Eastward dimension of European security. Militarily, an effort in further cooperation and 
rationalization needs to be made. The European Union has certainly a true potential to be a 
‘hard power’ if necessary, but not without streamlining its capacities. Finally there is no clear 
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leadership from a diverse enough group of countries. The idea of a ‘directoire’ is not disturbing 
as long as it includes homogeneous players but new entrants need to step up to the plate and 
seek leadership responsibilities. Under those conditions, Europe will be able to speak more 
effectively to the world and co-ordinate more coherent foreign policies. This will depend not 
only on putting institutional structures in place but also on the will and capacity of the member 
states to act. 
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APPENDIX A: ENLARGEMENT WAVES 
Enlargement refers to the process of accession to the European Community, later known 
as the European Union. The original Europe of Six (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands) has expanded in the following order into a Europe of 
25: 
• 1973: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom;  
• 1981: Greece;  
• 1986: Spain and Portugal;  
• 1995: Austria, Finland and Sweden;  
• 2004: Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
Enlargement now refers to this last wave of accessions culminating in the simultaneous 
membership of ten countries to the European Union on 1 May 2004. It has provided a 
unique opportunity to bring peace, stability and prosperity to the entire European 
continent.  
There are four candidate countries which have applied to join the Union:  
 Bulgaria and Romania: After officially recognizing their candidate status in 1997, 
the European Union opened negotiations with them in February 2000. In June 2004 the 
European Council reiterated the Union's intention to sign accession treaties with Bulgaria 
and Romania in 2005 paving the way for their accession in January 2007.  
 Croatia applied for membership to the Union on 21 February 2003. The 
Commission delivered its opinion on this request in April 2004 recommending that 
accession negotiations be opened. In June 2004 the European Council officially 
recognized Croatia as a candidate country. The negotiations initially due to begin on 
1 January 2005 are currently on hold and will remain so until there is full cooperation 
from Croatia with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.  
 Turkey submitted its application on 14 April 1987 and was officially recognized as 
a candidate country at the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999. At the 
European Council on 17 and 18 June 2004 the Union reaffirmed its commitment to start 
accession negotiations with Turkey without delay provided it complied with the 
Copenhagen political criteria. In its recommendation of 6 October 2004, the Commission 
concluded that Turkey satisfied the Copenhagen political criteria and recommended that 
accession negotiations be opened. Accordingly, the December 2004 European Council 
has planned to open accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005.  
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 The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia submitted its accession application 
on 22 March 2004 but has not yet obtained the official status of candidate country.  
Source: European Commission 
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APPENDIX B: ACCESSION PARTNERSHIP 
 
The accession partnerships concluded by the Council with each of the applicant 
countries bring together in one document the aid provided by the European Community 
to each applicant country, the conditions for granting the financing and the priorities for 
each sector in transposing Community law (the acquis). They are intended to assist the 
applicant country authorities in their efforts to comply with the accession criteria and 
they set out in detail the priorities for each country in preparing for accession, in 
particular implementing the Community acquis. The accession partnerships form the 
basis for programming pre-accession assistance from Community funds such as the Phare 
programme.  
 
These programs and the accession partnerships are adjusted over time by the 
Commission and the country concerned. The accession partnerships served as a support 
for other pre-accession instruments, including the joint assessment of medium-term 
economic policy priorities, the pact on organised crime, the national development plans 
and other sectoral programmes necessary for participation in the Structural Funds after 
accession and for the implementation of ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-
Accession) and SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural 
Development). They were also the starting point for the development of action plans to 
improve administrative and judicial capacities in the applicant countries. 
 
Following the signing of the Accession Treaty on 16 April 2003 and the official 
integration of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia into the European Union on 1 May 2004, the 
accession partnerships came to an end. 
 
Source: European Commission. 
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APPENDIX C: COMMUNITY ACQUIS 
 
The Community acquis is the body of common rights and obligations which bind 
all the Member States together within the European Union. It is constantly evolving and 
comprises:the content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties;  
the legislation adopted in application of the treaties and the case law of the Court of 
Justice;  the declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union; measures relating to the 
common foreign and security policy; measures relating to justice and home affairs;  
international agreements concluded by the Community and those concluded by the 
Member States between themselves in the field of the Union's activities.  
 
Thus the Community acquis comprises not only Community law in the strict 
sense, but also all acts adopted under the second and third pillars of the European Union 
and the common objectives laid down in the Treaties. The Union has committed itself to 
maintaining the Community acquis in its entirety and developing it further. Applicant 
countries have to accept the Community acquis before they can join the Union. 
Derogations from the acquis are granted only in exceptional circumstances and are 
limited in scope. To integrate into the European Union, applicant countries will have to 
transpose the acquis into their national legislation and implement it from the moment of 
their accession. 
 
Source: European Commission 
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APPENDIX D: PILLARS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
In Community parlance people often refer to the three pillars of the EU Treaty. These 
three pillars, which form the basic structure of the European Union, are: 
• the Community dimension, comprising the arrangements set out in the European 
Community (EC), European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) Treaties, i.e. Union citizenship, 
Community policies, Economic and Monetary Union, etc. (first pillar);  
• the common foreign and security policy, which comes under Title V of the EU 
Treaty (second pillar);  
• police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which comes under Title VI of 
the EU Treaty (third pillar).  
The Treaty of Amsterdam has transferred some of the fields formerly covered by the third 
pillar to the first pillar (free movement of persons). 
The European Constitution, which is currently being ratified, provides for a complete 
recasting of this system. The three existing pillars are to be merged, albeit with the 
preservation of specific procedures in the area of the common foreign and security policy 
(CFSP), including defence policy. 
Source: European Commission 
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APPENDIX E: IRB APPROVAL FORM 
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APPENDIX F: EXPLANATORY INTRODUCTION TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
APPROVED BY THE IRB 
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APPENDIX G: QUESTIONNAIRE TEMPLATE SUBMITTED TO THE 
RESPONDENTS ON THE PARTICIPATION TO TWO ESDP OPERATIONS 
 
Vivien Exartier 
MA Candidate Political Sciences 
Oklahoma State University 
 
Questionnaire on the participation of your country to two ESDP 
operations: First Operation of your choice 
 
Name of the operation: 
Questionnaire A2-1 
Please circle the right answer. Feel free to add any comments. 
 
1. How many troops does your country have involved with this operation? How long 
have you been there?   
 
0-100  
100-500  
500-1000 
1000 and over 
 
2. What are the main assignments of your troops other there?  
 
Peacekeeping  
Compliance with International Treaties 
Police  
Assistance Local Authorities 
 
3. Was your country involved in this operation before or after accession? 
 
Before accession 
After accession 
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4. At what stage of the operation did your country get involved? 
 
Planning 
When the fields operations began  
After the fields operation began 
 
5. Would you consider that your country is an essential actor in the decision-making 
of the conduct of the operation? 
 
Not important 
Somewhat important 
Very important 
 
6. What kind of military presence do you have there? Please specify how large for 
each category 
 
Army 
Navy 
Air Force 
 
7. What is your financial contribution to the total cost of the operation? 
 
0-20% 
20-50%  
50% and more                                                                                            
8. Was the participation to this operation relevant to the security of your country? 
 
No 
Somewhat 
Yes 
 
9. Was your participation relevant to the security of the European Union? 
 
No 
Somewhat 
Yes 
 
10. Did the EU authorities influence your decision? 
 
No 
Somewhat 
Yes 
 
11. Besides CFSP officials, have officials from other EU institutions influenced your 
decision to participate? 
 
No 
Somewhat 
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No 
 
12. If yes, which institutions influence your decision to participate? 
 
The European Commission  
The European Parliament  
Other 
 
13. Has your country consulted other Member States about the decision to 
participate in this operation? 
 
No 
Somewhat 
Yes 
 
14. If yes, how many member states have you consulted? 
 
0-5
5-10 
10-15 
 
15. Has your country consulted other New Member States about its decision to 
participate? 
 
No 
Somewhat 
No 
 
16. If yes, how many other New Member States have you consulted? 
 
0-3 
3-6 
6-10 
 
17. How will your involvement affect your national security in the near future? 
 
It will not affect it 
It will affect it somehow 
It will affect it a lot 
 
18. Do you think that the CFSP/ESDP was the most appropriate framework to 
handle this operation?  
 
No 
Somewhat but did not address all the concerns of the mission 
Yes 
 
19.If not, what do you think would have been a better framework?  
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NATO 
The UN 
A combination of the EU and NATO 
A combination of the UN, NATO and the EU 
A combination of the UN and NATO 
Other 
 
20. Generally, do you think the ESDP/CFSP is the right structure to address the 
needs of EU security? 
 
No 
Somewhat 
Yes 
 
21. What other operations are you involved with? 
 
EUFOR-Althea 
EUPM 
EUPM Proxima (FYROM) 
EU Mission for Iraq 
EUPOL Kinshasa 
EUSEC DR Congo 
EU Support to AMIS II (Darfur) 
 
22. Among the operations you are involved with, would you consider that one or 
some is/are more important than others? 
 
No 
Somewhat 
More important 
 
23. If another operation is more important, please rank the following reasons 
 
National Security Interest 
Military Presence 
Financial Contribution 
Other  
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